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PRO SE LITIGATION
LITIGATING WITHOUT COUNSEL:
FARETTA OR FOR WORSE
Ira P. Robbins--Susan N. Hernianr
I.

Introduction

In this publication one year ago,' it was argued that, although the pro se litigant generally is derided by parties, courts,

and counsel alike, 2 the procedures and general attitude of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in dealing

with such litigants effect, for the most part, 3 considerable fairness in the treatment of pro se supplicants and their claims. One
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court as well as
the pro se proceedings in the Second Circuit during the 1974-75
term-a year in which more pro se litigants received relief than
in any prior year in the history of the court-stimulates further
examination of the plight and problems of the litigant who proceeds without counsel. Especially crucial in this inquiry is the
ubiquitous frustration of the pro se litigant and the availability
of counsel to alleviate some of this discontent.
The Supreme Court case of Farettav. California4 involved
the question of "whether a State may constitutionally hale a per* A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1970; J.D., Harvard University, 1973; Member,
New York Bar;, Pro Se Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1973-75; Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law; Director,
Kansas Defender Project.
** AB., Barnard College, 1968; J.D., New York University, 1974; Member, New
York Bar; Pro Se Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
1974-76.
The authors are indebted to is. Jean Ferguson Shepherd, J.D. (Candidate), 1977,
University of Kansas School of Law, for her invaluable assistance in the preparation and
completion of this article.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors, and should not
necessarily be attributed to any judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
'See Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn
in the Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 769 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Misunderstood
Pro Se
Litigant].
2
Id. at 770, 775, 776-77, 787-88; see Lunz v. Preiser, 524 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1975)
(appeal from default judgment in petitioner's favor dismissed as moot; petitioner sought
to be "protected from [his] own ignorance").
3 See The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1, at 787; note 216 infra.
4 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

629

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: 629

son into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him,
even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense." 5 The setting was a grand theft prosecution in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, wherein the
accused requested, well before trial, that he be permitted to
represent himself. The trial judge warned the defendant that it
would be a mistake to refuse the assistance of counsel and,
further, that a pro se defendant would be required to follow all
of the "ground rules" of criminal trial procedure. 7 Nevertheless,
in a preliminary ruling, the trial court accepted Faretta's waiver
of counsel.
Subsequently, but still prior to trial, the court sua sponte reversed its ruling, stating, inter alia, that the defendant did not
have "a constitutional right to represent himself."8 Throughout
the trial, despite Faretta's objections, 9 the judge required that
the defense be conducted only through an attorney appointed by
the court from the public defender's office. 10 Faretta was found
guilty after a jury trial and was sentenced to a prison term. The
conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, which
agreed that a defendant had no federal or State constitutional
right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied
review. 11
On a grant of certiorari, 12 the United States Supreme Court,
after reviewing federal court precedent 13 and the British 14 and
American 15 jurisprudential evolution of self-representation, held
that a defendant in a State criminal trial has the right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects
to do so. The Court further held that the State may not force
a lawyer upon a criminal defendant who insists upon pro se representation, regardless of the extent of the accused's technical
legal knowledge.
5Id. at 807.
6

Id. at 808.

7 Id. at 808 n.2.

I Id. at 810 n.4; see People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1972).

9 422 U.S. at 810.
10
Id.at 810 n.5, 812 n.8; cf. United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 794 (1976). See also Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
11See 422 U.S. at 812.
12 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
13 422 U.S. at 812-17.

1d. at 821-26.
at 818-21, 826-32.

15 Id.
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While the implications and consequences of this determination are far from settled, 16 arguably the policy considerations
underlying Faretta would at least allow for increased use of the
discretionary appointment of counsel 17 for the pro se litigant,
and perhaps for recognition of the right to such representation,
at least in certain circumstances. 18 Parts II and III of this article discuss, in the context of the Second Circuit's recent experiences with pro se litigation, 19 many of the bafflements of counselless litigation. Part IV deals with the justification for the
assignment of counsel for various types of litigation. The article
concludes in Part V with the application of the Farettaanalysis
to post-conviction prisoner, and other civil, proceedings.
6

his dissent, Justice Blacmun recognized the following questions which have
yet to be answered with finality:
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so, when
must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and the right
to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each right to
be measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se,
does he still have a constitutional right to assistance of standby counsel? How
soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by
counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in mid-trial? May a violation of
the right to self-representation ever be harmless error? Must the trial court
treat the pro se defendant differently than it would professional counsel?
Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent,
526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975) (appellant claimed, inter alia, constitutional error by the State
trial court in allowing him to represent himself; held, intelligent Naiver); United States
v. Smith, 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1975) (pro se defendant plea bargained on his own behalf; held, inter alia,that admissibility of plea discussions followvs same rules as bargaining
with counsel); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 794 (1976) (held, inter alia, that so long as counsel was retained, the defendant could
not appeal pro se); note 48 infra and accompanying text.
7See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970). Section 300SA(g)
states:
Any person subject to revocation of parole, in custody as a material witness, or seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 22-55 of title 28 or section
4245 of title 18 may be furnished representation pursuant to the plan whenever
the United States magistrate or the court determines that the interests of justice so require and such person is financially un.ible to obtain representation.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970) states:
The court may request an attorney to represent any such rmdigentl person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is
untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
See generally The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1, passfin; Zeigler &
Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal
Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 157, 193-95 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Invisible
Litigant].
18 See Parts IV and V ifra.
is For past pro se experiences in the Second Circuit, see generally The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1. See also Breasted, You Can Beat Dead Hore, If
It's a FederalCourt Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1974, at 41, col. 4.
1 In
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The Problems of Litigating Pro Se

While it may be beneficial to have the right to proceed pro
se, it is only in a rare case that the pro se criminal defendant is
successful.2 ° It is not difficult, however, to perceive why some
individuals prefer to risk litigating without counsel. One reason
is the source of the counsel which is appointed. Faretta, for instance, believed that, due to the oppressive caseload of the public defender's office, he would receive less than a satisfactory

defense.21 An alternative explanation is mistrust of counsel,
either because of the party's attitude toward attorneys generally,2 or because a particular attorney has served the client's interests in other than admirable fashion.23 One recent

criminal proceeding on point illustrates both the perseverance
and patience of the pro se petitioner in seeking his fundamental

rights, and the insensitivity and, perhaps, negligence of his assigned counsel in attempting to protect them. In June 1972,
Morris Raymer, represented by court-appointed counsel, was
convicted of various narcotics offenses 24 in the federal district
20

See, e.g., United States v. Artega-Alvarez, Nos. 73 Cr. 950, 74 Cr. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 20, 1974) (unreported), discussed in The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra
note 1, at 781.
21 422 U.S. at 807 ("he did not want to be represented by the public defender
because he believed that that office was 'very loaded down with... a heavy case load.' ").
See Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974) (suit
to enjoin Legal Aid Society from increasing its caseload; dismissed for want of jurisdiction). Parenthetically, according to an article in the Criminal Law Reporter, one study
has concluded that "waiver of counsel remains common and is often openly eficouraged
by judges." 18 CR. L. RPTR. 2171 (Nov. 19, 1975). Query: does Fuller v. Oregon, 417
U.S. 40 (1974) (convicted indigent defendants must repay the costs of their legal defense
if they subsequently acquire the financial means to do so) have the same effect? A related issue is that of the right to choose one's counsel. See note 10 supra. See also
United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975) (right to counsel of
one's choice overrides serious conflict potential); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 1401
(5th Cir. 1975) (mem.) (defendant may insist on keeping attorney despite apparent conflict). But see In re April 1965 Grand Jury, 18 CR. L. RPTR. 2183 (D.D.C. 1975) (witnesses appearing before a grand jury may not be represented by the same attorney when
such representation would stifle the criminal process), rev'd, 18 CR.L. RpmI. 2401 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (issues not ripe for adjudication).
2 See The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1, at 773 & n.16.
2- A third possibility is that the defendant is more experienced in trial matters than
would be his novice counsel. See generally R. COHN, A FOOL FOR A CLIENT (1971); ef.
United States v. Artega-Alvarez, Nos. 73 Cr. 950, 74 Cr. 18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1974)
(unreported); Verdict for Client, Cuffs for Counsel, N.Y. Post, Dec. 11, 1974, at 2; note
20 supra.
2 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970) (racketeering); 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (now 21 U.S.C.
§ 960 (1970)) (importation); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970) (miscellaneous drug offenses); INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954 § 4705(a) (sale).
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court of Connecticut and was sentenced to a seven-year term of
imprisonment. In July of that year, Raymers attorney, designated by the trial court to represent him on appeal,2 duly
filed a notice of appeal in the district court. In October, however, because the trial minutes had not been transcribed, the
attorney moved the court of appeals for additional time in which
to file the appellant's brief.2 The court, on October 25, granted
an extension to December 1.27 The transcript was provided in
the interim, but on December 19-nearly three weeks after
the extended filing period had expired-counsel moved for a
further extension of time. 28 The court denied the motion and
dismissed the appeal 29 for failure to comply with its order of
October 25.30 Counsel allegedly moved the court on December
28 to vacate its order of dismissal, 3 ' on the grounds that there
was "a bona fide and substantial issue in need of appellate review," 32 and that he was not able to review the approximately
four hundred pages of trial transcript in time to comply with
the court's October order. Counsel's time problem, he claimed,
arose from his other commitments, which included civil and
25 The attorney would have been obligated to continue his representation even absent such a designation, unless the court ex.pressly terminated the appointment. 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1970); 2D CIR. R. 4(b).
26
The court for good cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time
prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may permit an
act to be done after the expiration of such time ....
FED.27R. App. P. 26(b).
United States v. Raymer, No. 72-1920, Order (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1972) (unreported) (per Friendly, J.).
28 Application for Extension of Time, No. 72-1920 (2d Cir., filed Dec. 19, 1972). See
note 26 supra.
29 Arguably the court's standard practice of dismissing an appeal from a criminal
conviction if the appellant's brief is not timely filed should not apply to cases in which
counsel is court-appointed in the same manner as it does to those in which counsel is
retained.
30 United States v. Raymer, No. 72-1920, Order (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 1972) (unreported). FED. R. APP. P. 31(c) provides, in pertinent part, that:
If an appellant fails to file his brief within the time provided by this rule, or
within the time as extended, an appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal.
Although Raymer's adversary made no such motion, the court dismissed the appeal sua
sponte. For a discussion of somewhat analogous sua sponte dismissals by district courts,
see Part III infra. One wonders whether counsel would have succeeded in securing a
further extension of time had he filed an application prior to the December 1 deadline.
3 We use the term "allegedly" because although counsel sent to Raymer a copy of a
motion for a further extension of time, there is no indication on the Second Circuit's
docket sheet that such,,a motion was ever filed, and no such papers are in the Second
Circuit's files. Thus, there has never been a ruling on the "motion."
- Application for Reinstatement of Appeal, No. 712-120, Exhibit D (2d Cir., filed
Aug. 21, 1974).
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criminal trials, between five and ten title searches a week,
real estate closings, preparation of all pleadings, "and miscellaneous other duties incidental to a general law practice, ' 33 as
well as his familial obligations 34 -interests which seem trivial
when compared with those of an incarcerated client seeking to
have his conviction reviewed on appeal. The attorney took no
further legal action.3 He apparently did not even notify Raymer of the status of the case.
One year later, the court, in response to Raymer's inquiry
on December 10, 1973, notified him of the order dismissing his
appeal. Still having heard nothing from the attorney, however,
Raymer wrote to him in February 1974, for the return of any
papers pertaining to his case, so that he might proceed pro se, 3 6
declaring that "[bly not answering and advising me of the circumstances, you may have caused me to lose any rights I may
have had . . . . 37A month later, and some fifteen months after
dismissal of the appeal, counsel corresponded with Raymer, who
had been incarcerated during the entire period. The attorney
apologized for his long-overdue response, enclosing a volume of
transcript which the indigent Raymer had requested, 3s along
with a bilfor the same. 39 He wrote:
As you know, I was not anxious to take the appeal in the
first instance . . . . To my great shock, my [December 19,
1972] motion for enlargement of time was never granted....
I must frankly tell you that it was my considered opinion that

no sustainable appeal existed, and that if we could miraculously prevail on appeal, a new trial would result in a conviction and in all probability, a more severe sentence . . . I
*.

-Id., Exhibit D-2.

34

!d.

I See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
6 Raymer apparently was not then aware that different counsel could be appointed
by the court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1970), which states: "The United States magistrate or the court may, in the interests of justice, substitute one appointed counsel for
another at any stage of the proceedings." See text accompanying note 42 infra.
37 Application for Reinstatement of Appeal, No. 72-1920, Exhibits K-K1 (2d Cir.,
fled Aug. 21, 1974).
38 Counsel knew or should have known of Raymer's indigency. Indeed, if Raymer
were not indigent, counsel would not have been appointed to represent him. See 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970).
'9 Application for Reinstatement of Appeal, No. 72-1920, Exhibit L (2d Cir., filed
Aug. 21, 1974).
40 Compare counsel's assertion in his "alleged" application to vacate the court's
order of dismissal, note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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am as anxious as you are to conclude the matter, one way or
the other. 4 1
In August 1974, Raymer petitioned for reinstatement of his
appeal. With little delay, the Second Circuit granted the application, removed the counsel, and assigned a different attorney to
represent Raymer, 42 relying upon unequivocal precedent mandating the protection of an indigent's appellate rights. 43
41

Application for Reinstatement of Appeal, No. 72-1920, Exhibits L-L1 (2d Cir.,
filed Aug. 21, 1974) (footnote added). Counsel continued:
By the way, you might be interested in that fact that last summer I defended a case (Heroin, 439 Bags) and obtained an acquittal, the fust ever
against [a particular prosecutorl The point is, I don't feel you could have had
better counsel at trial than you did-the die had been cast and a conviction was,
as I indicated, a virtual certainty.
Id.
4 United States v. Raymer, No. 72-1920, Order (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 1974) (unreported). It should be noted that despite counsel's comments on the merits of the appeal,
see notes 32 & 40 supra and accompanying tex% the underlying merits of the case have
no bearing on the question of restoring fundamental appellate rights where they wrongfully have been denied. United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 444 F.2d 2, 627-28
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 916 (1971); United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417
F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1969) (en bane), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970); see United
States ex rel. Singleton v. Woods, 440 F.2d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 1971); Wilbur v. Maine,
421 F.2d 1327, 1330 (1st Cir. 1970). See also United States ex rel. Williams v. LaVallee,
487 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d Cir. 19T3), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); cf. Rodriguez v.
United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969).
43 It is well settled that an indigent defendant is entitled to a review of his case on
appeal as a matter of right if the same right is extended to non-indigents. Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); see Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Eskridge v. Washington Prison
Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958); United States ex rel. Diblin v. Follette, 418 F.2d 408, 410 (2d
Cir. 1969). And the indigent is entitled to have counsel assist him in his appeal. Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 741-43 (1967);
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); United States ex t. Smith v. McMann, 417
F.2d at 654-55. The Criminal Justice Act explicitly provides for the appointment of counsel on appeal in federal cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1970). See also Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962).
Concomitant with this right of counsel on appeal, however, is the right to efccti'e
counsel. Thus, where, as here, an assigned appellate counsel perfected an appeal by
filing a notice of appeal, but did not prosecute it, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner was denied his constitutional right to effective
appellate counsel, stating that "[plerfection is half a loaf only, and here a half a loaf is no
better than none." Foxworth v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1971).
A standard recently adopted in other circuits is that a defendant (or appellant) is
entitled to "counsel... rendering reasonably effective assistance." Beasley v. United
States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster, 4S7 F.2d 1197,
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the effectiveness of counsel is the most fundamental right, "for it
affects [the client's] ability to assert any other right he may have"); West v. Louiiana,
478 F.2d 1026, 1032-34 (5th Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d
Cir. 1970) (en bane). There is no question that Raymer's attorney did not meet this
standard of "normal competency" in this case. He simply did not prosecute the appeal,
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Problems with one's counsel are not restricted to the criminal arena, nor to cases wherein counsel has been appointed by
the court." However, although an occasional pro se litigant is
thereby causing it to be dismissed. This inaction also would arguably qualify under the
Second Circuit's stricter test for the ineffective assistance of counsel--the "shock the
conscience" test. See United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950) ("shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice"). See also United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d
1327, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Walker v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1311,
1312 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Sanchez, 483 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Currier, 405 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S 914 (1969). Of
course, "[e]rrorless counsel is not required . . .[; rather,] there must be a 'total failure
to present the cause of the [defendant or appellant] in any fundamental respect.'"
United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1963), quoting Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963). If ever there was
a "total failure," this was it. This is not a case wherein counsel did such a poor job of
appellate representation as to "shock the conscience"--he did no job at all.
The court might have instituted disciplinary proceedings against the attorney. See
FED. R. APP. P. 46(c), which provides:
DisciplinaryPower of the Court Over Attorneys.
A court of appeals may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show
cause to the contrary, and after hearing, if requested, take any appropriate
disciplinary action against any attorney who practices before it for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with these rules
or any rule of the court.
Among the provisions of the American Bar Association's CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSEBILrrY (1970) that bear upon the present case are the following:
EC 2-31: Full availability of legal counsel requires both that persons be able to
obtain counsel and that lawyers who undertake representation complete the
work involved.
DR 2-110(A)(2): In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment
until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client ....
EC 6-4: Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper care to
safeguard the interests of his client.
DR 6-101(A): A lawyer shall not ...neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
EC 7-1: The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously ....
DR 7-101(A): A lawyer shall not intentionally .. .prejudice or damage his
client during the course of the professional relationship ....
"See, e.g., Hazzard v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1975) (mem.), qff'g 382
F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Hazzard claimed that she had been wrongfully denied
pension, social security, and other benefits, on the ground that when her husband died,
city officials incorrectly indicated on his death certificate that he was widowed. Therefore the main issue on her appeal, noted Hazzard inartfully, was "[w]hether the appellant
is dead or alive." Brief for Appellant at 3, Hazzard v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.
1975). Probably recognizing that the issues were more complex than she had anticipated,
Hazzard twice petitioned the Second Circuit for the appointment of counsel, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970). Both motions were denied, however, because the court was
not convinced of the non-frivolousness of her claims. Hazzard v. Weinberger, No.
74-2426, Orders (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 1975, June 11, 1975) (unreported). Subsequently Hazzard allegedly retained counsel, paying him $250 in advance, with another $250 to be
paid upon his filing a brief and arguing the appeal. But counsel filed no papers and did
not appear at oral argument.
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capable of arguing his cause well,4 most-like Raymer and unlike Faretta--fear both the substantive complexities and procedural entanglements of federal litigation. This is true both at
the trial level 47 and at the appellate level, where, for example,
one inventive criminal appellant sought permission to proceed
pro se, but with the assistance of stand-by counsel in the event
that the litigant found such support desirable. 48 This is not, of
course, to say that those who litigate without counsel are alvays
unsuccessful. 49 Most of those who do succeed, however, have
naively stumbled onto issues that are developed into triumphant
campaigns through the generous procedures afforded by the
Second Circuit, 50 which genuinely is concerned with the appearance of justice. 51 Successful results are what the litigants think
they were entitled to all along.
One case in which a disoriented litigant was aided by the
court is SEC v. Research Automation Corp.,52 where the principal issue on the appeal was whether a district court judge had
the power to enter a default judgment against a defendant who
appeared for the taking of his pretrial deposition but refused to
be sworn in or to testify, in a willful effort to disrupt and to
impede discovery. 53 On August 17, 1972, the Securities and
Exchange Commission [hereinafter referred to as the SEC]
commenced an action to enjoin the defendants from violating
various provisions of the Securities Act of 193354 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,55 the alleged violations springing
from an offer and sale of securities of the defendant corpo45 See, e.g., Lamb v. Globe Seaways, Inc., 516 F.2d 1352, 1357 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Oakes, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Oakes observed, "I cannot help but add that I uas
impressed by Mr. Lamb's manner, demeanor and obvious sincerity on oral argument of
his appeal pro se." Id. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 0-3 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975), discussed in The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant,
supra note 1, at 774-77; Widermann v. Richardson, 451 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971), notcd
in N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
4 See 422 U.S. at 808-10 & n.3.
47
See Part III infra.
I United States v. Rollins, No. 74-2610, Order (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 1975) (unreported).
49 See The MisunderstoodPro Se Litigant, supra note 1, passim.
5o Id. See generally The Invisible Litigant, supra note 17.

51The MisunderstoodPro Se Litigant, supra note 1, at 771-2, 767,88. But see text
accompanying notes 162 and 183-90 infra.
521 F.2d 585 (2dCir. 1975).

=Id. at 586-87.
5 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970) (prohibitions relating to interstate commerce and the
mails); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970) (fraudulent interstate transactions).

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) (manipulative and deceptive devices).
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ration. 5 6 After preliminary trial and appellate court proceed-

ings, 57 the SEC noticed the taking of the deposition of pro se
defendant Tserpes, president of the defendant corporation, 5 8 for
May 20, 1974, at the SEC's New York Regional Office, and requested that he bring with him certain documents. Tserpes appeared at the designated time and place, but insisted upon delivering the documents to the Regional Director personally and
56 Although most pro se actions involve prisoners, this is by no means always the
case. See generally, e.g., The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1, at 772-77.
57 These proceedings are described in 521 F.2d at 587-88.
58 In the course of its opinion, the court noted that "[i]t is settled law that a corporation may not appear in a lawsuit against it except through an attorney, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Continental Record Co., 386 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1967) . . . ." 521 F.2d at
589. See also Mercu-Ray Indus., Inc. v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1975)
(mem.), affg 392 F. Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("The law is absolutely clear that a
corporation cannot appear pro se in federal court"). Cases, dating back to 1824, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), and earlier commentary,
e.g., BROOKE, ABRIDGEMENT (1573) CORP. 28; 1 J. CHITTY, PLEADING (1809) *577;
ComYNS' DIGEST (1780) PLEADER 2 B. 2; 2 KENT'S COMIENTARY *291; Y.B. 2 Edw. III.
10 (1327); Plac. Abb., 15 Edw. I., Rot. 35, f. 273 (1287), are legion to support this proposition. See also Note, Appearance of CorporationWithout Attorney, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV.
371 (1938); 37 COLUM. L. REV. 313 (1937); 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 467 (1937); 22 MINN.
L. REV. 278 (1938). See generally 37 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1923); 17 RUTGERS L. REV.
651 (1963); cf. Note, May a CorporationAct as Its Own Attorney?, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 173 (1967).
Generally stated, the reasons given to support the rule are, first, that a corporation
is an artificial entity created by law, and, as such, cannot act as a natural person in
presenting its own case; second, that courts have no control over those who are not
licensed to practice before them; and third, that corporate litigation, which often is complex, requires more than an artlessly prepared case. It might, however, be argued that
the latter two reasons go too far-the second, because if courts are to have control over
their practitioners, then no party should be permitted to appear other than through
counsel; the third, because there are many types of complex litigation other than the
corporate variety, without restriction on pro se appearances. As for the first reason, we
submit that the corporation no longer is, in all instances, the same entity that it was in
the times of Coke and Littleton. For example, corporations have been held to be "persons" for the purpose of the constitutional protections of due process and equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., N. LAThN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 23, at 99 (2d ed.
1971). In fact, corporations may now even be coming within the ambit of "persons" for
the purpose of the forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). See S.O.U.P., Inc. v.
FTC, 449 F.2d 1142, 1143-45 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); Harlem River
Consumers Cooperative, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., No. 70 CIV. 4128,
Order (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1974) (unreported) (treble damage antitrust suit; leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted only for appeal from order denying preliminary injunctive relief). See generally Note, ProceedingIn Forma Pauperisin Federal Court: Can
Corporations Be Poor "Persons"?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 219 (1974). It readily could be argued from this that it would be inconsistent for a court to grant forma paupers relief to
a corporation which is too poor to litigate, and then dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff
corporation because it is too poor to afford counsel. Perhaps it is time for the courts to
re-examine the rule requiring counsel for all corporate litigation, rather than blindly to
follow precedent that has its roots in doctrine that developed three-quarters of a milennium ago, when corporations largely were different from many of those that exist today.
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receiving a receipt f-om him. Tserpes' mistrust of an intermediary caused a delay of nearly one and a half hours, until he
succeeded in forcing the Director to leave his other business in
order to comply with his request. Upon entering the room in
which the SEC's staff attorney was waiting to depose him,
Tserpes commenced "to engage in a course of obstructive conduct that made it impossible for [the staff attorney] to take the
deposition." 59 Finding it futile to proceed in the face of Tserpes'
disruptive acts and statements, 60 and Tserpes' refusal to be
sworn in, the attorney adjourned the deposition, and then unsuccessfully attempted to depose defendants Martos and Hamos,
also officers of the defendant corporation. In this effort, however, "he was frustrated by the further disruptive efforts of
Tserpes who . . . proceeded to volunteer statements, interrupt

the questioning, answer questions put to the deponents, and attack [the staff attorney] personally." 61 The staff attorney finally
adjourned the depositions entirely.
62
The SEC then moved in the district court, "purportedly"
pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,63 for an order striking defendants' answer and granting a default judgment; the Commission contended that Tserpes'
refusal to be sworn in constituted a non-appearance under Rule
37(d), 64 and was part of a general plan on his part to disrupt
the proceedings. The court assigned the matter to a magissL521 F.2d at 587.
60 Id.
6

1Id.

6

See id.

63

Rule 37(d) provides in part:

Failure of party to attend at own deposition . ... If a party or an officer,

director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the

officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with proper notice,...
the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action
authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party
failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds

that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.

The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excus d on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act
has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
64 FED.R. CrV. P. 37(d)(1). See note 63 supra.
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trate for a hearing. At the outset of that hearing, Tserpes asked
that a Greek interpreter be provided, claiming that he would
be unable to understand the proceeding. The magistrate informed him that, since he had made no showing of indigency,
he had no right to a court-appointed interpreter. In an ungenial
report to the judge, the magistrate stated that he thought that
Tserpes was sufficiently fluent in English so as not to require an
interpreter, adding that
the claimed inability of Mr. Tserpes to speak and understand
the English language, was, and is, in my view, a ploy and a
patent fraud upon the Court. .

.

. I found him to be com-

pletely articulate (albeit offensively so) in his utterances before me. . . . [At the prior proceedings] Tserpes was not only
able to speak and understand English ... but able to disrupt
and abort the deposition by a tirade and a filibuster. 6
The magistrate thought that Tserpes was "obnoxious and
obstreperous '66 and concluded that the defendant's course of
conduct was designed to harass and annoy the SEC. Accepting
the magistrate's recommendations, the district court granted the
SEC's motion, striking the answers of Tserpes and the defendant corporation and entering a default judgment against them.
A "purported appeal" 67 followed.
Obviously discomforted with the defendants' conduct,68 the
Second Circuit nonetheless recognized the harshness of granting
a default judgment for failure to cooperate in pretrial discovery
proceedings, 69 noting that such a disposition "must be used
cautiously . . . lest the resulting grant of relief amount to a
deprivation of property without due process. ' 70 The court, without guidance from the defendant, considered the history of Rule
37(d) and concluded that, in all fairness, the proper procedure
" 521 F.2d at 588 n.1.
66 Magistrate's Report, No. 72 Civ. 3513 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 7, 1974).
67 See 521 F.2d at 590.
68
Although the district court's decision is reversed . . . . the SEC's motion

for a default judgment and this appeal are attributable to the conduct of the
appellants and particularly that of Tserpes in willfully seeking through various
improper means to obstruct and impede the proceedings in the district court.
Had Tserpes not attempted, as [the magistrate] found, "to make a farce out of
the judicial process of [the] Court," no appeal would have been necessary.
Id. Compare United States v. Certain Land in the Town of New London, 492 F.2d 1381
(2d Cir. 1974) (pro se).
6

521 F.2d at 588.

70

Id.; see Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958).
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for the SEC to follow would be first to obtain a court order
directing Tserpes to be sworn and to testify. 7 1 This would serve
'the purpose of impressing upon the defendant the seriousness
of his actions and [avoid] a default judgment resulting from some
misunderstanding on his part. '7 2 Only if the defendant then refused to obey the court's order should the "drastic sanction
of default" be imposed. 73 Hence, despite the defendants' acrimonious behavior and lack of incisive legal logic on appeal, the order granting a default judgment against Tserpes was reversed. 4
The issue posed by cases such as Research Automation is
not only whether a pro se may have a legitimate claim of which
he is unaware, but also whether the court considers its responsibilities to include the search for and analysis of such claims
without the assistance of counsel. One alternative, of course, is
to appoint counsel after an initial screening of the claim to determine whether there exists a nonflivolous issue to be reviewed
on the appeal, 75 whether or not the pro se appellant requests
such aid. In one recent suit, after the appellant had filed his pro
se brief, the court perceived the subtle issue of retroactivity 7G
inherent in his contentions, and, one week before the hearing,
assigned counsel to brief the point and argue it before the
court. 77 The Second Circuit, however, is not reluctant to under7

1See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (a)(2). Rule 37(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part-

If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under
Rules 30 or 31,... the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer... in accordance with the request. When taking a.deposition on oral
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
72 521 F.2d at 589.
73 Id.; see FED. R. C-v. P. 37(b)(2) (sanctions by court in which action is pending).
I Because it was unclear to the court whether the defendants were aware of the
requirement of counsel for corporate litigation, see note 58 supra, the court affimed the
entry of a default judgment against the defendant corporation, but without prejudice to
its right to reopen the judgment in the district court upon satisfying the court that its
officers were unaware of the requirement, and that it would promptly appear through
counsel. 521 F.2d at 589-90.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970), quoted in note 17supra.
76
See generally Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Linldetter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
1 Ferguson v. United States, 513 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1975). The primary question in
Ferguson was whether Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1974), which held
that, pursuant to FED. R. CRL P. 11, the district court, at a guilty plea proceeding, is
required to inform the defendant that as a consequence of his plea he might be subject to
a mandatory special parole term, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1970), should be retroac-
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take independently an exploration for meritorious claims-an
attribute which reflects well on the integrity of both the court
and the legal system. Thus in Ferranto v. United States, 78 the
court exerted extraordinary effort in ferreting out a claim from
four words in parentheses. The district court had dismissed
without a hearing the petitioner's motion to vacate sentence, 79
on the ground that the same claims had been raised by him and
had been rejected in a previous application for similar relief.80
In each motion, the petitioner had alleged that the presentence report relied upon by the district judge in sentencing him
contained inaccuracies and misstatements with respect to his
record of prior criminal activity. s In denying his initial motion without a hearing, the court had assumed that the
petitioner was correct in alleging inaccuracies with respect to
three arrests recited in the presentence report, but nonetheless held the petition to be insufficient because the [sentencing] court . . . "did not rely to slightest [sic] degree on the
'8 2
charges referred to in the petition.

The district court had mentioned three other charges listed in
the presentence report as "factors in determining the length
of sentence imposed."'8 3 One of the three charges upon which
the district court did rely in imposing sentence was an arrest,
on October 26, 1957, for breaking and entering.
After meticulously perusing the papers on the appeal, the
Second Circuit wrote:
tive. The court answered the question in the affirmative, adding that the information
must appear on the record. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). One of

the Government's contentions was that the judge did advise Ferguson of the special
parole term-indeed, the judge so stated in his opinion below-but that the court reporter somehow failed to set it down. The Second Circuit responded:

We recognize, of course, that a court reporter cannot be infallible; but the
same must be said of a judge's memory, particularly when two years have
passed since events hardly exceptional before a district judge.
513 F.2d at 1013. See also Brewington v. United States, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975)
(mem.).
78 507 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
79The motion was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
8 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1970) (finality

of determination); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), providing in pertinent part that "(tihe sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar
relief on behalf of the same prisoner."
"I See Tucker v. United States, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).

507 F.2d at 408-09.
8 See id. at 409.
82
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Petitioner's present motion, like many motions of this
kind prepared by persons similarly situated, is not as clear as
a mountain lake in springtime. Most of the allegations, as the
court below recognized, are a mere repetition of the charges
raised in the first motion. Petitioner again seeks relief because
of the alleged errors in the presentence report with respect to
the three arrests upon which [the district judge] expressly
stated he had not relied in sentencing petitioner. However, in
addition to this, petitioner does refer to the arrest for breaking and entering on which the court had relied and alleges
that he pled guilty to this charge without the benefit of counsel. He claims that ... the sentence imposed upon him on the
. . . charge now in issue was illegally enhanced by the sentencing judge's reliance upon the prior breaking and entering
conviction which had been obtained in violation of his right to
counsel.
[This] claim was not presented in his previous motion
and has not yet been adjudicated.84

Petitioner's reference to the arrest for
was embodied in the words "pled guilty
rentheses placed after the citation of
was no indication that petitioner realized

brealdng and entering
without counser' in pathis conviction. There
that this fact presented

a new and different claim. The Second Circuit nevertheless con-

cluded that "the claim must be addhessed"''
case to the district court. 86

and remanded the

4 Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
8 Id.

"Id. See also United States ex rel. Irons v. Montanye, 520 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1975)
(commenced pro se). The problem of the similarity of claims and the Second Circuit's
response thereto is not restricted to prisoner applications for collateral relief. The issue
occasionally arises when the adversary or judge (who the pro se sometimes perceives
as an adversary) becomes embittered with the imbroglio effected by the pro se party,
and attempts to arrest adscititious actions. During the past term, one pro se litigant
sought to relitigate issues that the Second Circuit previously had held to be barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. See Boruski v. United States, 493 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.) (per
curiam), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 419 U.S. 808 (1974). The district judge, faed
with several separate attempts to have Boruski's claims reconsidered, entered an order
perpetually enjoining and restraining the plaintiff, Ernest F. Borusid, Jr., from
instituting any further action against the defendants or any of them in any court
in the United States based on any matters set forth in the complaint herein for
actions taken by such defendants in the course of their official duties as judge,
officer, attorney or employee.
Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Although there was some
support-though perhaps distinguishable-for such an order, see, e.g., Gambocz v.
Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 842 (3d Cir. 1972) (enjoined litigant wvas represented by counsel); Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1972) (prose litigant enjoined
only from filing similar claims in the court which issued the injunction); Ward v. Penn-
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While those pro se litigants who succeed often do not know
why, most of those who ultimately are unsuccessful and, not unexpectedly, dissatisfied with the Second Circuit's determination,
are not cognizant of the consideration given their claims. In fact,
in many cases the Second Circuit deliberated on and developed
areas of the law of which the party was not aware-such as federal common law, 8 7 or first-impression extensions of Supreme
Court doctrine-before ultimately ruling against the pro se
litigant. "8
Because the vast majority of pro se litigants are juristic
neophytes, a characteristic common to most such cases is
frustration-from delay;89 from distrust of opposing parties and
counsel; 90 from lack of familiarity with the law, judicial prosylvania N.Y. Cent. Transp. Co., 456 F.2d 1046, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1972) (pro se litigant
enjoined "from instituting any further action or actions against the defendants or any of
them in any court in the United States based on any matter set forth in the complaint");
Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 441 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1971) (enjoined litigant was represented by counsel); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 379 F.
Supp. 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (enjoined litigant was represented by counsel), the Second Circuit in Boruski, on its own motion, followed what it thought to be a better approach, viz., modifying the lower court order by adding to it the phrase "without prior
leave of this Court." Boruski v. Stewart, No. 74-2375, Order (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1975)
(unreported). See Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D.R.I. 1962), appeal
dismissed, 372 U.S. 226 (1963). This variation has the alvantage of assuring that the
litigant's papers pass the eyes of a judge, who may, as in Ferranto v. United States,
507 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1974), detect a different claim, rather than risking that the clerk
of the court might summarily refuse to file the papers merely because they name the
same adversary as in the prior action. Cf. Mercu-Ray Indis., Inc. v. Bristol-Meyers Co.,
508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1975) (pro se) (mem.) (inter alia, - rying adversary's application
-presented to the Second Circuit in the first instance-to enjoin further litigation).
87
E.g., Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1974) (question of when the civil
rights claim for relief accrued).
88
Compare Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975) (unnecessary
to reach question of extension of Supreme Court's defamation doctrines) with Jackson
v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975)
(first impression question of application of state action doctrine to tax-exempt private
foundations), discussed in The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1, at 774-77.
9 The summary judgment motion made by the adversary of one pro se plaintiff was
granted, the district court construing the statute of limitations to have barred the action.
The Second Circuit read the complaint more liberally, in accordance with the mandate of
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but, because in personam jurisdiction
was lacking, nevertheless affirmed the judgment below. Merckens v. F.I. DuPont, Glore
Forgan & Co., 514 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1975). The decision, however, permitted the plaintiff
'to frame a more explicit complaint and to make appropriate service if he so desires." Id.
at 21. Obviously confused by the division of functions between the district and appellate
courts, the plaintiff wondered why the Second Circuit did not hear the merits of his case.
In his petition for rehearing, he recounted at length the delay of more than a year since
the filing of his original complaint. Requesting relief, he stated in apparent frustration:
"The plaintiff demands that this Court stop f
around with this case." Petition for
Rehearing, No. 74-2663, at 3.
90 Sometimes this distrust is well-founded. When one pro se prisoner, for example,
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cesses, and even legal terminology; 91 and from lack of confi-

dence in a legal scheme that routinely refuses to afford amends
where the pro se feels they are due. 92 In some cases, the apperception of entitlement to redress is derived from fundamental
notions of common sense, as in cases where an indigent inmate

seeks to have his trial or other minutes furnished at the expense
of the Government, so that he may, on his own, comb the record

for possible reversible error to be challenged on a collateral attack The standard rule, however, has been that, in order to

obtain a transcript, the petitioner first is required to make a
showing of particularized need. 93 But, argues the prisoner using
elemental acumen, how can he "properly present his contentions" 94 with particularity before he is able to review the reccomplained of interference with mail from his attorney, who was a professor at the St.
John's University School of Law, a prison official responded: "No one is abusing your
right to legal mail, but it is difficult to assume that these Schools of Law are run by
competent attorneys." Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367, 1369 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1476 (1976); see notes 24-44 supra and accompanying text.
91 In response to a federal district judge's denial of his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the assignment of counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(1970), on the ground that no non-frivolous issue was presented, Raymond Lasky, not
fluent with legal terms of art, dramatically wrote:
Sir: you may call my efforts, awkard [sic], my grammatical constructions
irregular, my dreams of freedom naive, but FRIVOLOUS? NEVER!
Letter of Raymond Lasky to Judge Inzer B. Wyatt, Oct. 29, 1974, United States ex rel.
Lasky v. Lavallee, No. 74 Civ. 2407 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
m2See note 162 infra.
91 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1970) (section 2255 applications); 28 U.S.C. § 22.50
(1970) (habeas corpus applications). See generally Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 132, 1327
(1st Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 1971); Chavez v.
Sigler, 438 F.2d 840, 894 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d -32(4th Cir.
1964); and United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1963), in which it was held
that an indigent federal prisoner is not entitled to a transcript "merely for his examination in order to determine whether he wishes to engage in litigation," or "merely to comb
the record in the hope of discovering some flaw" (footnote omitted). But ef. Britt v.
North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 369 (196);
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 3Q5 U.S. 192
(1966); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1964); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477, 482-84 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-21 (1956). The Supreme Court has
left this question open. Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 286 (1970).
9 Application, Crossley v. United States, No. 75-8081 (2d Cir., filed Jan. 23, 1975).
The Second Circuit granted leave to proceed in forma paupers and assigned counsel to
brief and argue the issue of a particularized showing of need. Order (2d Cir. May 14, 1975).
Compare United States ex rel. Buford v. Henderson, 524 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1975) (commenced pro se) (inter a/la, State prisoner, who had been given and thereafter had misplaced the transcript, had sufficient knowledge of its contents) with United States ez re.
Lasky v. LaVallee, No. 75-8086, Order (2d Cir. June 3, 1975) (unreported) (pro se),
wherein the court
remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lasky or his attorney ever received a copy of the transcript, and, if it is found that his attorney
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ord of the proceedings. Recognizing this "catch-2255," 95 at
least one court, in a pro se case, held that a federal prisoner has
an absolute right to a copy of his trial transcript at Government
expense for use in preparing a collateral attack, stating: "we do
not read the Supreme Court's opinions nor the Constitution itself to require paupers to have better memories than the
affluent. "96
In other cases, admixed with a common sense claim for relief from legal injury is tangible physical injury to the litigant
-injury which cannot be denied, but for which courts often conclude that there is no legal remedy. Nathaniel Williams, for example, in a pro se handwritten civil rights complaint 97 filed
against a prison superintendent, a prison guard, 98 and unnamed
prison hospital officials, alleged that an assault had been committed upon him by a fellow inmate, during which that inmate
had cut off a large portion of Williams' right ear with a broken
jar.99 Williams further contended that the prison guard had been
standing next to him as a group of prisoners prepared to march
to lunch from their work, and that the guard had seen the attacker approach Williams from behind with the broken jar.
Rather than protecting or warning Williams, the guard allegedly
had jumped back and out of the way. Upon being taken to the
prison hospital, Williams had asked the hospital personnel to try
to suture the severed portion of his ear back on. Instead, he
claimed, they had told him that he did not need his ear, threw it
away (in what he claimed was a basketball-style shot), and had
sewn up the stump with ten stitches. 100 Before the filing of any
answers to the complaint, the district court, upon defendants'
motion, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
did and Lasky did not, whether Lasky made any effort to get a copy from his

attorney.
Id.
95 Cf. Tuttle, Catch 2254: Federal Jurisdiction and Interstate Detainers, 32 U.
Piwr. L. RE V. 489 (1971).
91 MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1974) (commenced pro
se), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 34 (1975). See generally Note, The Indigent's Right to a Transcript of Record, 20 KAN. L. REV. 746 (1972).
97 The complaint was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3) (1970),

and their jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
98

The term today might more properly be "correction officer." See, e.g., NEW YOiK
STATE SPECIAL COMM3ISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT passim (1972).
99 Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974).
100 Subsequently, Williams, on six different occasions, underwent plastic surgery on
that ear in the prison hospital. Id. at 543.
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action. Williams appealed.
In determining whether the complaint stated a cause of action for violation of his constitutional rights, the Second Circuit
correctly acknowledged three principles that governed its evaluation of the complaint: that Williams' allegations must be accepted as true;101 that a complaint should not be dismissed unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief;102
and that "pro se complaints such as this must be liberally construed."10 3 Employing these guidelines, the court ruled that a
complaint under section 1983 of title 42104 based upon inadequate medical treatment states a cause of action if it alleges
conduct that "shocks the conscience,"' 05 such as deliberate indifference by prison authorities to a prisoners request for essential medical treatment.

06

Williams' allegations evidently did

shock the conscience of the court. In the face of the State's argument that Williams' challenge to the doctor's decision to do no

more than sew up the wound was based on merely a difference
of opinion over a matter of medical judgment,10 7 the court expounded:
With respect to the refusal of prison doctors to provide
the medical care Williams requested when he was first
brought to the prison hospital, the allegations support the
claim that it was deliberate indifference toward Williams' medical needs, rather than an exercise of professional judgment,
which led prison medical officials merely to stitch the stump of
101 Id.; see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
508 F.2d at 543; see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
508 F.2d at 543; see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). The court
was especially
aware of this standard. See 508 F.2d at 544 n.7, 545, 546.
10 4
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
105 508 F.2d at 544; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
106 Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1225, 1226 (2d Cir. 1974); Corby v. Conboy,
457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, .94 (2d Cir. 1971);
see United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1970); Church v.
Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1969); cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
07
1 See United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1970).
See also Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972).
10

103

648

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: 629

his ear. Such a claim is supported by the allegation that Williams was told simply that "he did not need his ear" by doctors who then threw the severed portion away in front of him,
and also by the fact that if it was possible that Williams' ear
could have been saved by sewing it back on immediately at
the hospital, one would expect a concerned doctor to have
tried.'10
The decision of the district court was reversed in1 0part,
the case was remanded, ironically, for a "hearing."

10 9

and

108 508 F.2d at 544. The court continued:

Of course, it may turn out that the treatment Williams requested was impossi-

ble under the circumstances, or that there were other medical considerations
which led the doctors, rightly or wrongly, merely to close the wound with ten
stitches. But on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, and assuming that
evidence might show that sewing the severed portion of the ear back on was
practicable, the possibility that deliberate indifference caused an easier and less
efficacious treatment to be consciously chosen by the doctors cannot be completely foreclosed.
Id.
109 Dismissal of the complaint was affirmed as to the prison superintendent, on the
ground that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions such as this.
508 F.2d at 546; see Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1970); Wright v.
McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (pro se). But cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
238-49 (1974).
110 For other successful medical cases of pro se prisoners decided by the Second
Circuit in the 1974 term, see, e.g., Ellington v. Warden, No. 75-2082, Order (2d Cir.
June 2, 1975) (unreported). In that case, the prisoner, claiming to have tuberculosis, alleged that his medication "seemed to disappear." The district court dismissal was vacated and the case was remanded with directions to appoint counsel to assist the petitioner in determining through discovery whether any of the medical personnel at the
prison were callously indifferent to his known medical needs. See text accompanying
notes 227-31 infra. In Waltenberg v. Preiser, No. 75-2055, Order (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 1975)
(unreported), the prisoner, claiming that he had a history of tuberculosis, three ulcers, a
hiatus hernia, and that he had lost fifty pounds in a short period of time, alleged that
prison hospital personnel were indifferent to his medical needs. The dismissal of the
complaint by the district court was reversed on the ground that a claim of deliberate
indifference to petitioner's medical needs, as distinguished from negligence, was stated,
which entitled petitioner to an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues presented.
For some non-prisoner pro se medical cases which did not fare as well, see, e.g,
Edelman v. Weinberger, No. 74-2136, Order (2d Cir. May 21, 1975) (unreported), which
involved a challenge to the district court's decision upholding the respondent's denial of
petitioner's application to establish a period of disability and for disability insurance
benefits. The court of appeals denied relief on the ground that the findings and conclusions of the respondent, Secretary of H.E.W., are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence, as here. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). In a petition for rehearing, the frustrated petitioner sought a definition of the flexible concept of "substantial evidence,"
which she perceived as "bigger than a breadbox but smaller than an elephant." Petition
for Rehearing, Edelman v. Weinberger, No. 74-2136, Order (2d Cir. May 21, 1975) (unreported). In Pickens v. HEW, No. 74-1974, Order (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 1975) (unreported),
congeries of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970), were inter-
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For the pro se litigant, some cases, of course, evoke more
f-ustration than do others. That is to say, some cases contain
more sources of frustration, to lesser or greater degrees. To be
sure, the judicial system should strive to diminish such feelings
whenever possible, if one of its goals is the appearance of concern for all litigants."' Especially disconcerting, therefore, for
the litigant as well, apparently, as for the Second Circuit, is the
case glutted with frustration, part of which could be averted
without herculean labor, and is not. An unparalleled example is
United States ex rel. Schuster v. Vinceizt," 2 a case for which
the State of New York will earn no encomiums.
During the 1920's, Roy Schuster was a successful tapdancer, performing in theaters across the nation and earning
more than $200 a week, considerable by the standards of the
day." 3 On one tour through Milwaukee, Schuster, then 22, met
a girl, fell in love, and after a brief courtship agreed to marry
her. At his wife's inducement, he abandoned the stage and settled down to raise a family. He became a dancing instructor at a
substantially diminished salary, but, being industrious, was able
to increase his income. During the depression, however, his income shriveled from $150 to $11 a week. As the creditors closed
in, the romance evaporated, and when a formal separation action
was commenced, Schuster became so distraught that he attempted suicide. Mrs. Schuster responded to his distress by securing
a court order directing him to pay a fixed sum for the support of
his family. She pressed for the payments, which Schuster found
difficult to meet in those lean days, and demanded $40 a week in
alimony regardless of how little her husband earned. After Mrs.
Schuster threatened to have her husband jailed for contempt of
court if he did not pay, he again threatened to kill himself. Finally, during an unproductive meeting with his wife and her
lawyer, Schuster repeated his suicide vow," 4 drew a revolver
preted to provide that Pickens was not entitled to disability insurance because he was
not wholly disabled by a medically demonstrable physical or mental impairment from
engaging in "any substantial gainful employment," even though the type of work which
Pickens was capable of performing was not available in New York City, where he lived.
ILI See note 51 supra.
1- 524 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1975).
113 The facts as described herein are taken almost verbatim from the Second Circuit's opinions in United States ex rel. Schuster v. Vincent, 524 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1975),
and United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denicd, 396
U.S. 847 (1969).
114 Schuster allegedly pleaded with his vife's lawyer:
Will you please give me a chance, let me explain the situation? Let me prove to
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from his pocket, and-in the ensuing chaos-fired several shots,
fatally wounding his wife and injuring her attorney.
After a trial which lasted one week, Schuster was convicted
of second degree murder. During the trial, he claimed that he
had been in a state of panic during the melee and had been unaware of what was happening. To rebut this defense, the State's
psychiatric expert repeatedly denied that Schuster was suffering
from any form of delusion or mental disease. On November 2,
1931, Schuster, then 27 years old, was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of from twenty-five years to life.
Initially, Schuster was sent to Sing Sing; in 1935 he was
transferred to Clinton State Prison. There he made a good adjustment, becoming a model prisoner and teaching a "cell-study"
course leading to a high school equivalency degree, for which he
received a letter of commendation from the New York State
Board of Education. In the normal course of events, Schuster
might have expected to serve his time and to be eligible for
parole in 1948, when he was still young enough to build a new
life, and for unconditional discharge five years thereafter. But in
1941, Schuster became convinced of corruption at Clinton, particularly on the part of the official in charge of the prison education program. When he complained of this condition, the State
responded by transferring him to Dannemora State Hospital for
the Criminally Insane, without the formalities of a commitment
hearing.11 5 After a succession of unsuccessful State habeas corpus proceedings in which he challenged his translocation, Schuster, in 1968-after having been allowed to languish at Dannemora for almost 30 years-finally sought relief in the federal
courts. On April 24, 1969, the Second Circuit held that the
State's failure to afford Schuster a sanity hearing with substantially all of the safeguards and procedures granted to those involuntarily committed as patients in civil mental hospitals constituted a violation of Schusters rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1 6 The district court was
ordered
you I have no money. If you put me in jail Monday, you will put me out of
business. You will destroy my future, you will make me commit suicide.
United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d at 1074.

'I- The reader should recall that at Schuster's trial, expert witnesses for the State
several times rejected the notion that he was suffering from some form of delusion or
mental disease. Id.
116 410 F.2d at 1081.
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to hear and determine petitioner's application unless a hearing

is held by the courts of the state determining under the standards set forth herein the issues Schuster raises within 60
days from the date of issuance of the mandate herein, or such
further11 7 time as the District Court may for good cause
allow.

The cour's mandate issued on May 26, 1969, but the State
sanity hearing which the court ordered to be held within 60 days
never took place. The hearing initially was delayed-for three
years-because the State insisted on contesting Schuster's
choice of venue. 118 Although this venue question was never directly presented to the Second Circuit, the court did take the
occasion on a related matter to express its "wonder why the
State could not have waived this venue issue in view of the special circumstances here."" 9 Following continuing procrastination
by the State,' 20 and after many others had already received
12
Schuster-type hearings as mandated by the 1969 decision,
Schuster's own sanity hearing was finally scheduled for April 6,
1972-almost three years after the court's order requiring that
a hearing be held within 60 days, and 31 years after Schuster's
transfer to Dannemora. The State was still unable to bring itself
to allow Schuster the satisfaction he had sought for nearly 25
years-a determination after a hearing that he had been sane
and improperly transferred. Several days before the hearing
date, according to Schuster's unrefuted testimony:
[They called me up and said, "We are thinking about

sending you back to prison, what prison would you like to go
to?" I told him, "I have a hearing coming up, I would not want
to be transferred until I have had the hearing with a jury
trial," which I was entitled to there, and he said, "in that case
I'll have to take out a retention action against you." I said, "Go
ahead. I have no objection." He said, "You have no objection?"
I said, "No, none whatsoever!" Then he thought a '1while and
then he said, "No, I am determined to transfer you."'
117Id. at 1089. The State sought review by the United States Supreme Court, but
certiorari was denied. 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
118 See United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 440 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1971) (commenced pro se).
119 Id.

For a description of the course of events, see 524 F.2d at 15658.
Id. at 156.
22Transcript of July 28, 1972 Hearing, at 37-38, People ex rel. Schuster v. Vincent,
73 Misc. 2d 653, 342 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. CL. 1972), rev'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 596, 344
120
1
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Schuster was summarily transferred from Dannemora to Green
Haven Correctional Facility (not a mental institution) on March
29, 1972. This transfer provoked Schuster's motion to have the
court enforce its 1969 order mandating a hearing. The request
was denied, however,3 since the release from Dannemora had
mooted the hearing. 12
This prolonged frustrating abuse was not without its effect
on Schuster. A Parole Board hearing was held for him on May
16, 1972. This was the first point at which he was eligible for
parole, since the practice of the Board had been to deny parole
to anyone incarcerated in a mental institution; such persons
were conclusively presumed to be mentally ill. 124 Yet, expressing his acrid discontent, Schuster initiated the hearing by stating that he, in good conscience, could not accept Parole Board
supervision, because the Board had "cooperated with the corruptively motivated retention of me 24 years beyond the date
of merit ... [and because] the [P]arole [Bloard is not morally fit
to supervise anyone, certainly not me.' 125 He added that he
"would not accept parole. Absolutely not. I am 25 years over my
parole time. I would regard even an offer of parole, as a gratui1 26
tous insult.'
Schuster subsequently filed a State habeas corpus petition,
seeking unconditional release. 12 7 Although the court did not
order his absolute discharge, it did direct the State Parole Board
to promptly conduct another hearing and to "give due weight to
the existing unusual and extraordinary facts which . . . appear
to compel unencumbered parole.' 128 Unable to accept this, the
State-in what the Second Circuit described as "an act of
Tartuf[flian self-righteousness"1 29-appealed, obtaining a reversal of the lower court order. The appellate division held that
"[a]s long as the Parole Board violates no positive statutory requirement, its discretion is absolute and beyond review in the
N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1973), leave to appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 1009, 309 N.E.2d 430,
353 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1974).
125 No. 32194, Order (2d Cir. June 15, 1972).
124
See United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d at 1076 n.3.
125 Minutes of May 16, 1972 Parole Board Hearing, IIS-440467, GH.CF.-17722.
12 Id.

127 People ex rel. Schuster v. Vincent, 73 Misc. 2d 653, 342 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct.
1972), rev'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 596, 344 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1973), leave to appeal
denied, 33 N.Y.2d 1009, 309 N.E.2d 430, 353 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1974).
128 73 Misc. 2d at 655, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 21.

12- 524 F.2d at 158.

19761

PRO SE LITIGATION

courts . ... -13 Leave to appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals was denied,' 3 ' and, having exhausted available State
judicial remedies, 132 Schuster returned anew to the federal
courts.
After reviewing the papers, the district judge
was moved.., and held a hearing on November 22, 1974 at
which the petitioner and a representative of the Parole Board
were present. At the urging of the Court, the representative
of the Parole Board went so far as to consent to a Special
"release agreement" which would relieve petitioner fiom most
of the ordinary conditions of parole. The obligation to make
periodic reports were [sic] waived, the [P]arole [Bloard was
not to interfere with petitioner's life, and petitioner was not to
be returned to prison unless he should commit another crime.
Petitioner rejected this, continuing to demand nothing less
than unconditional discharge. as
Recognizing his very limited power over the State Parole Board
and his consequent inability to order Schuster's release, the
judge reluctantly dismissed the habeas petition. Schuster ap34
pealed.'
The opening sentence of the Second Circuit decision on
appeal-the decision was rendered only 18 days after oral argument, probably to avoid further delay in Schuster's caseadumbrated the overall tone for the opinion:
Although we are reasonably certain that the shocking
story revealed in The Gulag Archipelago 1' could not take
place in this country, the facts of 136
Roy Schuster's case are
reminiscent of Solzhenitsyn's treatise.
Chief Judge Kaufman, who had written the 1969 Schuster
opinion for the court, recalled with disbelief the "appalling sequence of events" which left Schuster "languishing" in prison for
13 42 App. Div. 2d at 597, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 737.

13133 N.Y.2d 1009, 309 N.E.2d 430, 353 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1974).
1
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c) (1970).
32

13

Memorandum and Order, No. 74 Civ. 1705, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1975) (un-

reported).
134 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1970), the district court granted a certificate of
probable cause, Order, No. 74 Civ. 1705 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1975), which is required in
order135to appeal from the denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

A. SOLZHENITsYN, THE GULAG ARCmPELAGO (1973). See also A. SOLZHENrisYN, THE GuLAG ARCHIPELAGO 11 (1975). See generally Robbins, Book Review,
Brothers of Gulag, 62 Va. L. Rev. 462 (1976).
136 524 F.2d at 154 (footnote added).
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44 years, when, for conviction of a similar crime, the typical
term of imprisonment is some 29 years less. 137 The panel was
deeply disturbed by the "continuing procrastination"'13 8 of the
State. Unable to understand why the State did not attempt to
secure a pardon to extricate the parties from this cul-de-sac' 39although in light of its "obdurate treatment"' 40 of Schuster the
State's inaction is not difficult to comprehend-the Second Circuit discerned the State's abnegation of Schuster's constitutional rights, and its "total callousness to the ordinary decency due
every human.' 1 4' The court continued:
Not satisfied with the severe psychological pressures it had
already imposed on Schuster during his three decades at Dannemora, the State has continued to employ every conceivable
artifice and device to exacerbate the petitioner's understandable frustration and bitterness-and indeed to induce him to

reject parole and its concomitant of five more years under
state supervision. Although the State-after repeated prodding by [the State Court, the District Court], and this
Court-has recently exhibited a slight, reluctant moderation
of its attitude, this change has proved insufficient
to heal the
2
emotional scars 34 years in the making. 14

Adjudging finally that Schuster's continued imprisonment approached the threshold of cruel and unusual punishment 143 by
violating "the most elementary standards of decency,' 44 the
court concisely communicated precisely that which Schuster for
so long had hoped to hear:
We can no longer sit by and permit the State to continue

toying with Roy Schuster's freedom. 14
Relying on its equity jurisdiction, the court held that the
State-by its "wholly unjustifiable" and "oppressive confine37

1

138
139

Id.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 158 n.11. In fact, the district court expressly brought this alternative to

the attention of the State. See Memorandum and Order, No. 74 Civ. 1705, at 5
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1975) (unreported).
140 524 F.2d at 156.
141 Id. at 158.
142 Id. at 159 (footnote omitted).
143
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
144 524 F.2d at 160; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958).
4 524 F.2d at 158. Compare United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669
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ment ' 146 of Schuster, which "grievously wronged' 47 him, and
by other "inexcusable breaches of good faith"14 8 -had "egregiously" 149 and "flagrantly" 50 violated the spirit of its 1969
mandate. Ratiocinating therefrom, the cort concluded that had
the transfer from Dannemora been effected in 1969, as it should
have been, Schuster would have been offered and would have
accepted parole during that year. Thus, he was considered to
have been "constructively paroled" 151 in 1969. In addition, because "Schuster's prison behavior [had] satisfied conditions far
more strenuous than any the State could or would have imposed
in 1969," 15 2 the court deemed him to have completed by 1974 five
years of unrevoked parole.' 5 3 The judgment of the district court
was reversed, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
granted, and the State was ordered to absolutely discharge
Schuster from its custody forthwith. 154
Roy Schusters case assuredly is not unexceptional, nor does
155
its analytical foundation necessarily rest on solid legal ground.
Many of his impressions and experiences, however, poignantly
exemplify those of the more typical litigants without counsel in
the Second Circuit, and, we dare say, in other courts-State and
federal-as well. The pro ses' sensibilities are bruised, for example, by those aspects of our legal system that members of the
bench and the bar take for granted, such as the normal dalliances of juridical operations, adversarial exaggeration and
(2d Cir. 1957): "We must not play fast and loose with basic constitutional rights in the interest of administrative efficiency."
14 524 F.2d at 161.
1

4 7

Id.

148 Id.
1

49 Id. at 160.
150 Id. at 161.
51

1 Id.
52
1 Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
153 Id.
154 Id. Ordinarily, the Second Circuit's mandate issues "21 days after the entry of

judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order." FED. R. App. P. 41(a).
Such a procedure was followed here.

1-5 It may be that "hard cases make bad law," Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting), but the Second Circuit ex-

pressly restricted its ruling to the precise situation before it:
Our conclusion that Schuster was constructively paroled in 19G9 and absolutely discharged in 1974 is based entirely upon facts conceded-explicitly or
implicitly-by the State.... Thus, our holding is limited to the facts presented
here, and we are not substituting our judgment or our appraisal of the facts for
that of the Parole Board on matters properly left to its discretion.
524 F.2d at 161 n.21. See also note 191 infra.
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elocution, and alternative explanations and interpretations of
laws and rules. In short, pro se litigants want "justice, ' "1 and
they want it immediately. But this does not mean that once a
pro se controversy reaches the Second Circuit, it is always decided either in a manner that alleviates negative sentiments or
in accordance with the established principles that presumably
should govern it. One pro se prisoner, for example, sought injunctive relief and damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act,15 7
based on the alleged unconstitutional interference by prison officials with mail sent by his attorney. 158 Recognizing that there
may have been at least one instance of such meddling, 159 the
court nevertheless declined to grant relief, one ground being
that there was no indication that the plaintiff had suffered any
actual damage as a result of the interference. 1 0 Yet, as one
judge accurately elucidated in dissenting from the court's denial
of en bane reconsideration, "[t]his is a civil rights claim. An allegation of damages purely nominal in nature, therefore, is en6
tirely sufficient.' '
Also particularly disappointing to the counselless litigant is
to see what he considers to be, and often is, his legitimate claim
effectively ignored by the court, occasionally due to the case's
distasteful facts' 62 -such as an axe murder" 3 or a killing of a
156 See The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1 passim.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1479 (1976),
petitionfor rehearing en bane denied, 521 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1975) (one judge dissenting).
ISOMorgan claimed that prison officials had unconstitutionally opened and inspected
mail from his attorney out of his presence, and that in one instance the last two pages of
a brief sent from his attorney were missing as a result of the package being opened out of
Morgan's presence. Id. at 1370-71.
'rO Id. at 1371, 1372; cf. note 91 supra.
161 521 F.2d at 694 (Oakes, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Joseph v. Rowlen, 425 F.2d
1010 (7th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965), and cases cited
therein. See also United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 589 (2d Cir.
1975) (commenced pro se) (damages not found excessive); cf. Washington v. Corbet, No.
74-8112, Order (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 1974) (unreported) (pro se).
162 Alternatively, the law may simply have no remedy for an apparent wrong. See,
e.g., Pickens v. HEW, No. 74-1974, Order (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 1975) (unreported),
described in note 110 supra; cf. Szyka v. Secretary of Defense, 525 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.
1975) (pro se). See generally The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant, supra note 1, at 773.
Or, the court may be of the opinion that the time is not right for the consideration of i
particular claim. One example is that of prisoners' personal property rights. Until recently, a claim of mere infringement of property rights, or theft or confiscation of property by prison officials, was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Eisen v.
Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969) (pro se), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). See also
Urbano v. Calissi, 384 F.2d 909, 910 (3d Cir. 1967) (pro se), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 925
(1968); Almond v. Kent, 321 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (W.D. Va. 1970) (pro se), rev'd on other
157

158
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police officer. 16 Such facts are, of course, theoretically irrelevant to disposition of a collateral attack. 1 In one case involving
the murder of a police officer, for example, William Stanbridge
grounds, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972); Howard v. Swenson, 314 F. Supp. &q3, 8-4
(W.D. Mo. 1969) (pro se), affd, 426 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1970); Argentine v. McGinnis, 311
F. Supp. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (pro se). However, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), which undercut the Eisen
court's distinction between "constitutional rights" and "property rights," courts have
begun to recognize that property rights of prisoners are entitled to section 193 protection from abuse by prison officials. See, e.g., Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 405 U.S. 1036 (1972); Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1973) (pro se)
(seven packs of cigarettes); Schumate v. New York, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (pro se) (clothing); Lathan v. Oswald, 359 F. Supp. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (pro
se) (cigarettes and groceries). Although the Second Circuit has yet to explicitly decide
this issue, it has recognized the Supreme Court's rejection of the Eisen distinction. See
Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309, 1311 (2d Cir. 1974) (pro sc). Thus, it %%as indeed surprising when, in a later case, the Second Circuit found the prisoners' property rights
claim to be frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970), which establishes a court's
power to dismiss a frivolous claim pursued in forma paupers. Esser v. Knapp, No.
74-8402, Order (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 1975) (unreported) (one judge dissenting) (eighteen
carat gold wedding band). In Hiney v. Wilson, 520 F.2d 589, 590 (2d Cir. 1975) (pro se),
the court took the drastic measure of summarily remanding the case, on a preliminary
application, and in a full opinion, for the "guidance" of the district court; yet, although
it expressly considered other claims of the petitioner, the court did not discuss the
property claim. To the same effect, see Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1975)
(pro se); Ransom v. LaVallee, No. 75-8153, Order (2d Cir. July 17, 1975) (unreported) (pro
se) (clothing); Coggins v. Preiser, No. 73-8391, Order (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 1975) (unreported) (pro se) (photograph). For other issues similarly ignored, see Bloeth v.
Montanye, 514 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1975) (pro sc) (rights of prisoners in protective confinement); Stewart v. Preiser, No. 75-8079, Order (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 1975) (unreported)
(pro se) (rights of prisoners seeking temporary educational furloughs). See alo text
accompanying note 252 infra.
163 United States ex rel. LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 803 (1976).
'6
United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 138 (1975). For another case wherein the facts may have dissuaded the Second Circuit from confronting the ultimate issue, see Beshaw v. Moeykens, No. 74-1&37,
Order (2d Cir. June 2, 1975) (unreported) (pro se) (the ultimate issue concerned the procedural due process rights of pretrial detainees, but the prisoner twice had escaped from
State custody).
16 E.g., Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 696 (1949) (guilt or innocence irrelevant
to habeas corpus review); United States ex r e. Gockley v. Myers, 450 F.2d 232, 240 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972); Wagenknecht v. Crouse, 344 F.2d 920, .21
(10th Cir. 1965), and cases cited therein; Shaver v. Ellis, 255 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir.
1958); United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 146 F.2d 349, 351 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945). "[W]hat we have to deal with is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt, but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1.03) (Holmes, J.); cf. Thompson v.
Church, 1 Root 312 (Conn. 1791) ("[Tlhe business of the court is to try the case, and not
the man;... a very bad man may have a very righteous case."). See generally R. SOKOL,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS § 2 (1969); American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE AD'muNIsTRATio\, OF
CRIMMAL JUSTICE, Post Conviction Remedies 464-65 (1974).
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filed a habeas corpus petition claiming, inter alia, that his confession, used against him at trial, had been coerced by a physical
beating at the hands of Nassau County police and detectives. At
his Huntley hearing, 166 Stanbridge testified that, from the moment of his apprehension until the time that he made his inculpatory statements, he had been subjected to constant and continuous beatings; that he had been thrown into an automobile by
police officers and, while being transported to the precinct, he
had been punched about the head and body; that in the station
house he had been subjected to the same abuse and, in addition,
had been pummelled, belted, thrown to the floor and kicked, and
threatened with a cocked gun; that these beatings had continued
in relays, with the participation of some ten officers and detectives; and that of the seven hours that he spent in the precinct
prior to making his statement, he had been beaten during at
least five. He further testified that his chest and the area
around his ribs were black and blue, and that his legs, thighs,
67
and calves were discolored. 1
The State trial judge chose, as was his prerogative, 168 to
disbelieve evidence in Stanbridge's favor. He did not believe
Stanbridge's testimony that he had been beaten by a particular
detective with a leather device commonly known as a
"slapper'-which is designed to facilitate beatings without leaving tell-tale marks-in the face of evidence that that detective
owned such a device. 169 He did not believe the testimony of
three experienced criminal lawyers that, on the day of arraignment, their respective clients-Stanbridge and his two codefendants-had borne severe bruises and ecchymoses over
their chests, arms, and legs. He did not believe the testimony of
the co-defendants that they, too, had been similarly and severely
beaten. 170 Finally, he did not credit the prison medical records
made in the regular course of business by the jail physician, who
had written of Stanbridge shortly after the alleged beatings:
166 See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
Huntley represents New York State's compliance with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964), which held that a confession, claimed by a defendant to be involuntary, is not admissible at trial unless there has been a prior determination that the confession was
given voluntarily.
167 Minutes of Huntley Hearing at 55-174.
16
"E.g., Quinones v. Quinones, 139 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
169 Trial Transcript at 494.
170 Minutes of Huntley Hearing at 190-396.
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Pain in the anterior chest. Claims he was beaten up by

the police. Tenderness along the anterior chest and ecchymosis left chest anteriorly. Contusion and ecchymosis of

the anterior chest. 171

Instead, the judge found that Stanbridge's confession was
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, stating that "[tihe testimony smacks of an exaggeration reminiscent of Shakespeare's
statement in Hamlet, 'The lady doth protest too much, methinks.' "172 The judge based his disbelief of the testimony in the
defendants' favor on four factors: first, that a photograph taken
of the defendants the day after the killing showed no marks or
injuries; second, that the defendants had not complained to the
District Attorney about the beatings-indeed, Stanbridge had
thanked the D.A. after the questioning was finished; third, that
there was a picture of one co-defendant's bare chest, not introduced into evidence, which showed none of the signs of the injuries claimed by him; and fourth, that the testimony of the defense attorneys was suspect because the attorneys had failed to
summon witnesses to view the alleged injuries on the defendants' bodies.' 73
Regarding point one, it was true that the photograph of
the three defendants 74 showed no signs of bruises other than a
bandage on one co-defendant's hand. However, it was also true
that, in the photograph, each of the defendants, including Stanbridge, was fully clothed, with only hands, face, and neck bare.
The photograph revealed nothing about the condition of Stanbridge's chest, ribs, thighs, and legs-the places where he allegedly had been beaten and kicked. Regarding point two, it
was true that Stanbridge had not complained of police brutality
to the District Attorney, and that, in response to the D.A.'s
statement, "All right, thank you very much, lir. Stanbridge,"
Stanbridge had responded, "Thank you." However, Stanbridge
171

Id. at 795.

172Id. at 12.

Stanbridge stated, in his district court papers, that
[irt
goes without saying, of course, that [the State judge] chose to believe the
testimony of the 12-15 policemen, detectives, and jailers, who swore that they
did no evil, saw no evil, and spoke no evil toward or about Stanbridge and his
co-defendants.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 27, United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker,
72 Civ. 965 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 1972).
17 4
Trial Transcript, opposite p. 1748.
173

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: 629

testified that he had been threatened repeatedly by the police,
who had indicated that if he complained to the D.A. about the
beating he would be beaten again, even more severely. 175 Moreover, the exchange of "thank you's" may have indicated nothing
more than instinctive politeness, or, perhaps, relief that the
sleepless, night-long ordeal was finally at an end. 1 76 Regarding
point three, there was a strong probability that the photograph
or condition of the bare chest of a co-defendant-whom Stanbridge had not seen all night, and who had arrived at the station house six hours later than Stanbridge-was neither material nor apposite to Stanbridge's assertion that he had been
severely beaten. Moreover, the photograph was not properly
considered by the court, since it had never been introduced into evidence. Finally, regarding point four, the record of the
Huntley hearing established that, within hours after consulting with their attorneys for the first time, the defendants had
filed a complaint of police beatings, along with a demand to see
the ranking officer in the jail at the time. 17 7 At his first opportunity, Stanbridge himself had complained to the jail physician.
Moreover, at arraignment, the defense attorneys had requested
that the judge designate a physician not employed by the Nassau County police or jail system to examine the defendants for
injuries. 178 The motion had been denied. Some fifteen to thirty
minutes later, the attorneys had renewed the request before another judge of the same court. 179 That motion had been denied.
They then had requested that the judge himself examine the defendants' bruises. 8 0 That motion, too, had been denied.
Thus, of the four sources advanced in support of the State
court's finding of the voluntariness of Stanbridge's confession,
one was irrelevant and immaterial (point three); one was unsupported by the record (point four); one was easily explained by
the record (point two); and one was totally preposterous (point
one).
Without any doubt, "[t]his [was] the sort of case where feelings run high-any case involving the vicious killing of a police
Minutes of Huntley Hearing at 138.
178 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959): "The drama was not played
out, with the final admissions obtained, until almost sunrise. In such circumstances
slowly mounting fatigue does, and is calculated to, play its part."
177 Minutes of Huntley Hearing at 884-85.
175

178
17

Trial Transcript at 620.
Id.at 626-27.

18OId.

at 627.
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officer is bound to produce such feelings."' 81 But this is precisely
the type of case that demands scrupulous care not only on the
part of police to prevent such claims as those made by Stanbridge from arising, but also on the part of judges to adequately
resolve them once made. Unfortunately, it appears that no such
care was taken in this case. 18 2 When the issue reached the Second Circuit in 1975,183 the

court described

and decided

Stanbridge's contentions in the text of its opinion:
He contends that during [the seven and a half hour interval at police headquarters] he was deprived of sleep, food and

advice of counsel. There is, however, no evidence that
petitioner requested any of the three. Indeed,4 he at no time
stop.18

indicated a desire that the interrogation

Nowhere in the text did the court mention the claim of brutality. Rather, in an innocuous footnote, it added:
Although Stanbridge also contended that physical violence
was used by the interrogating officers, this allegation was
rejected by the state judge who conducted the Huntley

hearing. 185

Nothing further was mentioned of this claim. There was no discussion of the applicability to this claim of that section of the
habeas corpus statute which allows for federal court redetermination of facts decided by a State court in certain cases, including those wherein the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;""; wherein "the applicant
did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State
court proceeding"; 187 wherein the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding"; 8 8 or
wherein the State court determination "is not fairly supported
"81 People v. Aoll, 21 N.Y.2d 706, 709, 234 N.E.2d 698, 699, 287 N.Y.S.2d 675,
675-76 (1967) (Burke, J., dissenting).
1'2 See id. (dissenting opinion). It is settled law that a confession, no matter how
true, cannot be admitted against a defendant if it is the product of beatings, torture, or
lesser forms of physical coercion. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
"8I United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 138 (1975).
I 84 Id. at 47 (footnote omitted).
18 5Id. at 47 n.4.
18828 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(3) (1970).
L87 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6) (1970).
188 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(7) (1970).
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by the record." 18 9 In brief, the court was blind to Stanbridge's
principal claim. 190
Like Schuster, Stanbridge is not a typical case. But it is the
cases which border on the extreme that test the fortitude of the
legal system. 191 These cases, to varying degrees, reflect the express or implicit frustrations of most pro se litigants. However,
most of the cases discussed in this section mirror frustrations
not necessarily caused by the litigant's counselless state. The
court's reaction to Schuster's protracted fight for freedom, the
avoidance of fact in Stanbridge, the answer to the legal question
of whether complaints like that in Williams state a claim, presumably would be the same whether or not counsel entered an
appearance. In fact, in the final stages of the litigation in each of
these three cases, counsel was assigned by the court, and participated in the ultimate victory, or defeat, on appeal. The cases
discussed earlier in this section 192 demonstrate the Second
Circuit's willingness to ensure this parity between the pro se
and the litigant with counsel by helping a pro se litigant to
achieve whatever measure of success he might have won with
competent representation. To the extent that the court is willing to scrutinize pro se papers to find claims the litigant did not
know existed, to forgive the pro se litigant certain procedural
18928 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1970).
190 Further, Stanbridge's petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was
unsuccessful. 96 S. Ct. 138 (1975). Compare United States ex rel. Lewis v. Henderson,
520 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975) (commenced pro se). A less weighty claim made by Stanbridge was that there was no probable cause for stopping and searching his automobile.
As the Second Circuit panel noted,

[pjetitioner's automobile may have been one of the most easily identifiable
vehicles ever utilized in a criminal venture. It was a 1955 green Chevrolet with
a raked body (the back end higher than the front), Buick tail lights, a Cadillac

grill, a louvered hood and spotlights in place of rear view mirrors on each side
of the car. The "For Sale" signs in each of the auto's back windows provided
further recognizable and unique characteristics. [See trial transcript pp. 455-571
United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d at 46 n.1.
191

See generally L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969). As Justice

Oliver Wendell Holmes observed:
[G]reat cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles
of law will bend.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
92
1
See text accompanying notes 24-88 supra.
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irregularities and, above all, to treat the pro se seriously and
sympathetically, the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel on appeal are ameliorated. However, as the next section
shows, the Second Circuit's avuncular attitude toward the pro se
litigant does not provide a complete picture of the pitfalls of proceeding pro se.
III. The Procedural Obstacles to
Pro Se Litigation
No rule of procedure within the Second Circuit explicitly
discriminates against the individual who proceeds without counsel. Nevertheless, the pro se litigant suffers many setbacks and
frustrations caused by his pro se status, and by the hallmark of
the majority of pro se litigants-poverty. 193 The preceding section set forth some of the reasons why an individual might
choose to proceed pro se. 194 However, for the civil litigant, who
has no constitutional right to court-appointed counsel,'9 5 proceeding without a lawyer is often not a matter of choice, but
rather, of economic necessity. Except in infrequent test cases,
or cases susceptible to treatment on a contingency fee basis, indigency generally precludes legal representation. Under the
provisions of section 1915 of title 28,19r indigency does not also
preclude access to the courts.197 An individual who can no more
193 A study of pro se complaints filed in the Southern District of New York for the
years 1967-71 disclosed that 84% of the pro se plaintiffs surveyed had proceeded in forma
pauperis, and that 93.3% of incarcerated pro se litigants had proceeded in forma
pauperis. The Invisible Litigant, supra note 17, at 187 n.112.
1
94 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
19 The sixth amendment, by its terms, guarantees a right to assistance of counsel
only in "all criminal prosecutions." U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VI. The Supreme Court's holding that this guarantee mandates appointing counsel at government expense to assist
indigent criminal defendants, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), has never been
extended to civil litigation.
119628 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, iy a person
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and
affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.
197 As one commentator put it, the forma pauperis statutes "open the court house
door, albeit not very far." Duniway, The Poor Man in the Fcderal Courts, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 1270, 1277 (1966) (footnote omitted). Judge Duniway, of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, provides a discussion of indigents' access to the courts
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afford to pay filing fees than attorneys' fees can seek leave to

proceed in forma pauperis which, if granted, would entitle a
litigant to eschew docketing fees, security charges, bonds and
deposits, and would provide the court with authority to assign
counsel to represent the litigant at government expense. 198
Thus, for most pro se litigants, who require relief from filing
fees and/or desire court-appointed counsel, an application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis is a necessary preliminary to

federal court litigation. However, this privilege is also the
source of a notable difference in the treatment of papers received by the courts.

A two-pronged test is utilized to decide an application seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. First, the court must be
satisfied that the applicant is in fact indigent. 199 This inquiry
before the passage of federal forma pauperis statutes, id. at 1271-77. See also Maguire,
Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923).
While leave to proceed in forma pauperis is generally regarded as a statutorily
granted "privilege," see, e.g., Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appcals in
§ 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 345-46 (1967), there is some justification for regarding this procedure as a right. See id. at 359, where Justice (then Circuit
Judge) Blackmun suggested that the forma pauperis designation has assumed "certain
characteristics of a right." Further, many commentators have suggested that indigents
have a constitutional right of access to the courts, grounded in the first amendment, the
Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223 (1970); Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153 & 1974
DUKE L.J. 527; Silverstein, Waiver of CourtCosts and Appointment of Counselfor Poor
Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. L. REV. 21 (1967); Note, The Right of Access to Civil
Courts by Indigents: A Prognosis, 24 ABIER. U.L. REV. 129 (1974); Note, Aid for Indigent Litigants in the Federal Courts, 58 COLUMi. L. REV. 832 (1958); Note, The Heirs of
Boddie: Court Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGTS-CiV.
LIB. L, REV. 571 (1973); Note, Limited Access to the Courts: An Appraisal of Fee
Systems, 41 U. CHL L. REV. 841 (1974); Note, Indigent Access to the Courts: The Tiger
Is at the Gates, 26 VAND. L. REV. 25, 37-65 (1973); Note, A FirstAmendment Right qf
Access to the Courtsfor Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973).
198 Leave to proceed in forma pauperis will relieve the indigent litigant of the burden of court filing fees, see 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1970) (authorizing a $15 filing fee for
civil complaints, and a $5 filing fee for a habeas corpus petition) as well as other incidental court charges such as payment for certification of copies of documents, typing abstracts of docket entries, and fees for filing depositions from another court; and possibly
of security bonds, see Gift Stars, Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).
Once a litigant has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, he may also request
that the court allow him to obtain transcripts of federal court hearings at government
expense, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 753(f), 2250 (1970), or that the court assign him counsel at
government expense, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970). These forms of relief are dliscretionary. For a discussion of the scope of section 1915 as it relates to other auxiliary expenses,
see The Invisible Litigant, supra note 17, at 190-96.
199See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a),(d) (1970). See Adkins v. DuPont Co., 335 U.S. 331
(1948).
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does not often pose any problems, as indigency is judged by a
generous standard, 20 0 and the application usually is granted
without further scrutiny if the affidavit of poverty accompanying
the application 201 is sufficient on its face. 20 2 The second prong of
the test, at the district court or appellate level,20 3 involves an
assessment of the merits of the case.20 4 To decide whether an
appeal in forma pauperis should be allowed, the statute specifies
that the reviewing court must determine the appellant's "good
faith." The Supreme Court has defined this requirement as an
objective standard, connoting the existence of some nonfrivolous
issue for review on appeal. 20 5 In the context of a criminal appeal, the Court also warned that the good faith test is not to be
converted into a requirement of a preliminary showing of any
degree of merit, stating that, unless the issues the criminal appellant wishes to raise are so flivolous that the appeal would be
dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant, forma pauperis
status should be granted and the appeal allowed to proceed. 20 6
In light of this pronouncement, the indigent criminal appellant, at least, is not subjected to any more rigorous degree of
pre-appeal review on the merits than a nonindigent litigant
might be. Whether the same egalitarian standards apply in non20 See Addns v. DuPont Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948); Willging, FinancialBarriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEO. L.J. 253, 257 (168); Note, Aid
for Indigent Litigants in the Federal Courts, 58 COLUL L. REV. 832, 839-42 (1958);
Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516, 524-25
(1968).
2 01
See Form 4, FED. R. App. P.
20
2 This is the practice in the Southern District of New York. See The Invisible
Litigant,supra note 17, at 188 & n.117.
203 Forma pauperis applications are considered at both levels. Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (1970), the district court determines whether to authorize proceedings in forma
pauperis in the district court. Under FED. R. App. P. 24 (a), if a litigant is granted such
leave in the district court, he will automatically be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis
on appeal, unless the district judge certifies that his appeal "is not taken in good faith."
If an individual has not sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis during the district
court proceedings but wishes this relief on appeal, Rule 24 (a) requires that he present
his application to the district court before seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal from the circuit court of appeals. Thus, the circuit court of appeals will consider
motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal if the district court has certified
that an appeal 'is not taken in good faith," or if the district court has denied a motion for
leave2 to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
0o Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43 (1915).
205 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
26
o Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (per curiam). The other cases wherein
the Supreme Court discussed the good faith standard were also direct criminal appeals.
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 433
(1962); Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565 (1957).
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criminal cases is an open question.2 °7 The possible denial of
equal protection inherent in allowing a more stringent preappeal review of cases brought by indigents is apparent. 208 For
this reason, several members of the Supreme Court have expressed the opinion that the same standards must apply in civil
cases, allowing indigent civil appellants to appeal in forma
pauperis unless their appeals are so utterly frivolous that they
would be dismissed even if the appellant were not indigent.
However, even if the "good faith" requirement is as easily satisfied in civil appeals as it is in criminal appeals, 20 9 the fact remains that only the indigent litigant is required to surmount this
hurdle at all. It is no answer to say that an identical appeal
brought by a nonindigent litigant might have been dismissed
prior to plenary consideration had the court discovered its lack
of merit. There is generally no procedural stage in a nonindigent's appeal where the circuit court of appeals would undertake a review of the merits of the appeal before briefs are filed
and argument is heard. 210 Justice Douglas has suggested that
this disparate treatment of the indigent appellant, i.e., substituting a summary pre-appeal review for plenary consideration, constitutes an invidious discrimination on the basis of wealth, and a
denial of equal protection of the laws, no matter how leniently
the term "merit" may be defined. 211 As Justice Douglas points
out, the "good faith" or frivolity standard is hopelessly elu207

But see Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 358 F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966). Judge Lumbard suggested that a more
rigid standard of review of indigents' appeals is justified by the fact that leave to proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege, and that the court is footing the bill.
208 Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Meltzor v. C.
Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 958 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also Lawson v. Prasse, 411 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1969); Ragan v. Cox, 305
F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962).
209 The dissenting Justices in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 458-69
(1962), complained that the flexible definition of "good faith" had, in effect, repealed the
forma pauperis statute by eliminating the "good faith" requirement entirely.
210 The court may consider the merits of an appeal on a motion to dismiss in a
criminal appeal, FED. R. CROM. P. 39(a), or in a civil appeal under FED. R. APP. P. 27 &
2D Ci. R. 27(a).
Proceeding upon the theory that the good faith requirement has, indeed, been eliminated, at least in criminal appeals, see note 209 supra, several members of the Court
have suggested that the procedure of screening forma paupers appeals should simply be
abandoned. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 294-95 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 458 (1962) (Stewart & Brennan, JJ.,
concurring).
211 Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 62-65 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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sive, 212 as shown by the number of cases in which the Supreme
Court has reversed lower courts' determinations that only frivolous issues had been presented in particular cases.2 13 Especially where the appellate court is confronted with pro se motion
papers, which generally are no more informative than to say
that the prospective appellant is poor and that he believes
that the district court has erred, there is little assurance that
the existence of a nonf-ivolous issue will be discovered.
Thus, Justice Douglas' suggestion that the second prong of
the test be eliminated, and that an indigent appellant be allowed
to proceed on a sufficient showing of indigency, 214 would eliminate an inequality built into forma pauperis review-an inequality that exists, no matter how lenient a standard is used to
assess the merits of an indigent's appeal. However, this is another area where the willingness of the court of appeals to treat
215
an indigent pro se litigant with "appropriate benevolence"
can do much to alleviate a potentially unfair system. In the
1974-75 term, the Second Circuit found nonfr-ivolous issues presented by pro se appellants and granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis in 42 cases which district judges had already
found to be frivolous.216 Generally, these meritorious issues
were unearthed by the court's complete review of the district
court record and by independent research-only infrequently
were the nonfrivolous issues explicitly presented
by the pro se
217
motion papers, or by the district court opinion.
The more serious problems engendered by the disparity of
treatment inspired by the forma pauperis statute-problems of
equal protection, due process and efficient judicial administration-occur in the district court. Section 1915(d) provides
that, in a case where the litigant seeks to proceed in forma
2I

d. at 65.
3 See cases cited in id. at 61 n.8; Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 44041

2
21

n.1 (1962).
211 Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. at 65-66.
215

Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841

(1970).

21, Of these cases, 13 were habeas corpus petitions brought by State prisoners,
where the Second Circuit granted a certificate of probable cause, see 28 U.S.C. § 23
(1970), 7 were motions to vacate sentence by federal prisoners, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1970), and 22 were civil rights cases, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19S3 (1970).

These cases are on file in the Office of the Pro Se Clerk, United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit.
217 For a discussion of the methods used by the court of appeals in reviewing pro se
appeals, see The Invisible Litigant, supra note 17, at 219-46.
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may dismiss the case . . . if satisfied

that the action is frivolous or malicious." Some courts have interpreted this provision as allowing a district judge broad discretion to screen on the merits any case wherein the plaintiff
seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, and to dismiss cases found,
on this preliminary review, to be "frivolous. ' 218 Because leave to
proceed in forma pauperis is a necessary preliminary to the
docketing of an action where the litigant cannot afford to pay
the filing fee, interpreting section 1915(d) to allow such independent review often leads to sua sponte dismissals in pro se cases
even before the complaint has been filed or served, and before
any answer or any responsive pleading or motion has been
required.

2 19

218 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970). For one of the earliest cases interpreting section
1915(d) to authorize this procedure, see O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245 (1st Cir. 1904).
The disparity in treatment engendered by the adoption of this procedure is aggravated
by the fact that some courts review the denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
the concomitant summary dismissal of the indigent pro se complaint on an "abuse of discretion" standard, see Jones v. United States, 453 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1972); Williams
v. Field, 394 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891 (1968), rather than applying
the orthodox standard on review of the dismissal of a complaint, i.e., that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted). Some courts
have further compounded this discriminatory treatment by ruling that the court's discretion to grant forma pauperis relief should be exercised sparingly in civil cases for
damages, see, e.g., Flowers v. Turbine Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975),
and particularly avariciously in prisoners' suits against their keepers, see Daye v.
Bounds, 509 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975); Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966); Weller v. Dickson,
314 F.2d 598, 604 (9th Cir.) (Duniway, J., concurring), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963)
(stating that forma pauperis should be denied even if a claim is stated, if the court is of
the opinion that the prisoner's chances of ultimate success are slight). This niggardly
attitude toward allowing prisoners to proceed in forma pauperis has been carried to extremes, as shown by the following statement of standards to be applied:
A court therefore should be satisfied that there exists substantiality as to such a
claim, of justiciable basis and of impressing reality before it permits a prisoner
to maintain an action therefor on in-forma-pauperis privilege....
Only in a rare and exceptional situation has there been or can there be
made to appear such clear substantiality of justiciable basis and of impressing
reality as to entitle a prisoner's claim on institutional treatment to be so asserted. . . .Such a situation will ordinarily involve regulation, discipline, or
discrimination of such character or consequence as to shock general conscience
or to be intolerable in fundamental fairness ....
Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1965). Since most prisoners require leave
to proceed in forma pauperis, see note 203 supra, such insurmountable standards, requiring that the conscience of the court be shocked by the claim asserted before the suit may
even be commenced, effectively closes the courthouse door to some prospective plaintiffs
who have suffered a legally cognizable wrong. Fortunately, the Second Circuit has never
adopted such a position.
219 See FED. R. Crv. P. 4(a) (issuance and service of a summons are accomplished
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Cases before the Second Circuit in the 1974-75 term have
occasioned the court's consideration of the problems created by
these sua sponte dismissals. Palamount is the question of
whether such summary treatment constitutes a denial of due
process or of equal protection of the laws. As one example,
plaintiff Samuel Johnson brought a civil rights complaint in the
Northern District of New York, alleging that he had been assaulted by seven prison guards whose names he did not know,
and that he had been wrongfully transferred from a State prison
to Matteawan State Hospital without a hearing. 220 Johnson's
complaint was poorly drafted-he named as defendant the warden of the prison where he allegedly had been assaulted, rather
than the seven prison guards. Since the doctrine of respondeat
superior has been held not to apply in civil rights actions,221 and
since Johnson had alleged no facts connecting the warden with
the alleged assault, his complaint was formally inadequate because of his failure to join the prison guards as defendants.
However, sufficient facts had been alleged to state a claim of
assault against the prison guards and, since Johnson was proceeding pro se, precedent requiring liberal treatment of pro se
cozmplaints 2 would seem to have mandated allowing Johnson
the opportunity to amend his caption by naming the prison
guards as defendants, and to proceed to discovery in order to
attempt to learn the names of these individuals. However, under
the authority provided by section 1915(d), the district cout dismissed the complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim,
even before an answer had been filed. On finding that a nonfrivolous claim had been stated, the Second Circuit vacated the
dismissal and remanded the matter to the district court "in
order that the defendant may answer or make such motions ad3
dressed to the complaint as he deems advisable."2
In a similar case, Fred Putman, Jr., brought a pro se
complaint in the Northern District of New York alleging that
medical personnel at the prison where he was incarcerated had
"[ulpon the ling of the complaint"); FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a) (answer is to be served 20
days after service of the summons and the complaint).
220 Johnson v. LaVallee, No. 75 Civ. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1975).
221 See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denicd, 414 U.S.

1033 (1973); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1970); cf. Wright v.
McIann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
2
2
See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Eisen v. Eastman, 421
F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139
F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
2 Johnson v. LaVallee, No. 75-8179, Order (2d Cir. July 30, 1975).
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refused to afford him adequate medical treatment for his tubercular condition. 224 Since Putman alleged that he had had a serious medical problem, and that the named defendants had not
only been aware of his problem, but had shown deliberate indifference in refusing to treat him, his complaint was sufficient
under previous Second Circuit case law 225 to make out a claim of
denial of eighth amendment rights. Again, the district court,
under the authority of section 1915(d), dismissed the complaint
sua sponte, without requiring an answer, on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a claim of constitutional magnitude. In
this case, too, the dismissal was vacated and the case remanded
in order that the defendant might answer or move against the
complaint. 226
In a third case, Irving Ellington brought a pro se complaint
in the Eastern District of New York, alleging that, when he had
been transferred from an upstate prison to the Brooklyn House
of Detention, medication he was required to take for his tuberculosis had been sent as part of his personal effects, but that the
medical personnel at the Brooklyn House had simply refused to
locate the medicine and give it to him, despite his repeated
requests.227 Ellington alleged that he had been ill throughout his
stay at the Brooklyn House, and that he had not seen his medication until he had been transferred back to an upstate prison.
Subsequently, he was again sent to the Brooklyn House of Detention, accompanied by his medicine. When the same sequence
of events was repeated and the medicine again "seemed to disappear ' 228 Ellington decided to sue. As a temporary visitor to
the institution, Ellington did not know the names of the persons who, by keeping his medicine from him, had caused him to
suffer bouts of tuberculosis. He therefore brought his civil rights
complaint against the warden of the institution and "Medical
Personnel Known and Unknown." The district court properly
dismissed the suit against the warden, due to the lack of any
allegation that the warden had had any knowledge of or direct
Putman v. LaVallee, No. 75 Civ. 281 (N.D.N.Y. 1975).
Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Bishop v. Stoneman,
508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis,
429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970) (disagreement in medical judgment not enough to state
claim); Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1969).
221Putman v. LaVallee, No. 75-8196, Order (2d Cir. July 30, 1975).
227 Ellington v. West, No. 74 Civ. 1443 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
224

225Compare

228 Id. (Complaint).
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involvement in this asserted denial of medical attention.2 2 9 The
court then went on to dismiss the entire complaint, sua sponte,
for "failure to name the parties," since deleting the warden's
name had left the caption with no specifically named individual.2 30 This case too was remanded by the Second Circuit,
with specific instructions that the district court assign counsel to
assist the plaintiff, so that the names of the prison medical personnel might be discovered. 2ml
The Second Circuit has long disfavored summary treatment
of any case, particularly dismissals for failure to state a claim for
"mere technical defects or ambiguities in pleading."2 2 To dismiss a pro se complaint for a relatively technical defect that
could be corrected easily, were the pro se plaintiff advised of the
problem, compounds the potential due process violations posed
by summary treatment. For this reason, many courts have held
that before a complaint-particularly a pro se complaint-is dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff
should be given notice and an opportunity to supplement his3
papers in order to cure whatever defect the court has noted. 0
In all three of the cases discussed above, a simple amendment of
the caption was all that should have been necessary to prevent
dismissal of the complaint. The Second Circuit's treatment of
these cases indicates a general agreement with the principle that
the pro se litigant should be given a fair opportunity to correct
such flaws rather than have his complaint dismissed perfunctorily.
Pre-answer summary dismissals, moreover, often seem to
be almost as unfair to the court as they are to the confused pro
se plaintiff. When a case is dismissed sua sponte on review of
the forma pauperis application, the record on appeal is comprised only of a pro se complaint and a brief order announcing
that the complaint fails to state a claim, or a memorandum not22

Accord, authorities cited note 221 supra.

2 0

3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a). But see Bivens v. Six Unkno\n Named Agents, 403

U.S. 388 (1971); Miller v. Director, Middletown State Hosp., 146 F. Supp. 674, 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1957).
221 Ellington v. West, No. 75-2082, Order (2d Cir. June 2, 1975).
232 Arfons v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1958).
23 Literature, Inc. v. Quinn, 482 F.2d 372, 374 (lst Cir. 1973); Urbano v. Calissi,
353 F.2d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1965) (pro se); Harmon v. Superior Court, 307 F.2d 796, 793
(9th Cir. 1962) (pro se); see Martin v. Johnson, 471 F.2d 704, 705 (6th Cir. 1973) (pro se)
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1357, at
611-14 (1969).
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ing some other defect. The question of whether a complaint
states a claim is scarcely a litmus test of the legitimacy of the
pro se's grievance, and the court of appeals will often disagree
with the district judge's evaluation of the merits of an asserted
claim. Where the court determines on review of a summary dismissal that the complaint does state a claim, the case will undergo protracted treatment that might have been unnecessary
had a fuller record been made. For example, had the defendants
been required to file answers or to make motions in the cases
discussed above, the existence of some dispositive defense might
have been disclosed, thereby obviating the necessity of shuffling
the case between the district court and the court of appeals
while the merits of the claim itself were debated. For this
reason, several other federal circuit courts of appeals have expressly advised their district courts that it is a better practice to
allow a complaint to be filed in forma pauperis, if accompanied
by a facially sufficient affidavit of poverty, so that a proper rec234
ord can be made for review.
At least one case in the Second Circuit last term showed the
advisability of this procedure. The pro se litigant in the case had
brought a civil rights action against both the former Governor of
New York and one of the governor's assistants, seeking damages for what he alleged to have been an illegal extradition to
another State. The district judge dismissed the complaint sua
sponte, before responsive pleadings were filed, citing two
grounds: first, that the complaint failed to state a cognizable
claim under the civil rights statute, and second, that the claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.235 Whether an illegal
extradition can give rise to a claim for damages under section
1983 of title 42236 is an interesting question that has received
varying answers in the courts. 237 Because this would have been
2
Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975); Duhart v.
Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973); Campbell
v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1972); Owens v. Brierly, 452 F.2d 640, 642-43 (3d
Cir. 1971); Brown v. Schneckloth, 421 F.2d 1402, 1403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
847 (1970); Foster v. United States, 344 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1965); Ragan v. Cox, 305
F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962). But see Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d 130, 132-34 (7th
Cir. 1975), overruling United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d
105 (7th Cir. 1953).
233 Purdue v. Rockefeller, No. 75 Civ. 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1975).
2-6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 104 supra.
237 Compare Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974) and Pierson v. Grant,
357 F. Supp. 397 (N.D.v-pwa 1973) (holding that a claim cognizable under § 1983 is
stated) with Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Va. 1972) and Johnson v. Buie,
312 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (holding that no cognizable claim is stated).
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a case of first impression for the Second Circuit, it was fairly
evident that the district court had erred in finding that no claim
had been stated. Thus, the court of appeals was left with the
other ground for the district court's dismissal of the complaint-that the suit was time-barred. The statute of limitations
is, of course, an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the
defendant; therefore, it is not a proper ground for a sua sponte
dismissal.2 8 Because the complaint should not have been dismissed sua sponte, the court of appeals vacated the dismissal
and remanded the case with instructions that the defendants
be directed to answer the complaint. 239 Doubtless the judges
felt a sense of futility in this exercise of proper judicial administration, knowing that as soon as an answer was filed, the defendants in all likelihood would raise the statute of limitations,
since they already had been advised by the district judge that
this was a valid and conclusive defense, and the case would grind
to a halt. Had an answer been filed initially, the number of pro240
ceedings this case generated probably would have been halved.
In short, Justice Douglas' view that an indigent litigant,
upon a showing of poverty, should be treated in the same manner as any other litigant has much to commend it at the district
court level too. The uncertainty involved in applying the "frivolity" standard under section 1915(d), 241 the convolutions that sua
sponte dismissals force many pro se actions to undergo, and the
unsavory possibility that the indigent pro se litigant will be afforded only summary justice, are all factors that should outweigh the modest financial cost of allowing the indigent pro se
his full day in court. The Second Circuit's treatment of fora
pauperis cases seems to indicate an inclination toward this view.
But until the Second Circuit speaks more explicitly on this issue,
the indigent pro se seeks forma pauperis relief only at the peril
228 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). The statute of limitations, as an affirmative defense,
may be waived by defendant. See, e.g., Bush v. Remington Rand, 213 F.2d 456, 464 (2d
Cir. 1954).
239
Purdue v. Rockefeller, No. 75-8102, Order (2d Cir. June 3, 1975).
2

40 This case is also exemplary of the amounts of time consumed when the district
court reassumes jurisdiction of a complaint previously dismissed. Although, here, the
cause was remanded on June 3, 1975, an inquiry in December 1975 disclosed that no an-

swer had yet been filed. Purdue v. Rockefeller, No. 75 Civ. 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1975) (docket
sheets); see note 89 s upra.
241 See Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 65 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Williams

v. Field, 394 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 3.93 U.S. 891 (1968); Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma PauperisAppeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D.

343, 346-49, 359 (1967).
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of having his case summarily dismissed. With the only alternative being not to litigate at all, the indigent pro se must bear
that risk.
Apart from the barrier of the forma pauperis statute, pro se
litigants suffer numerous other setbacks that may be attributed,
at least in part, to their lack of legal representation. Several of
the cases discussed previously were derailed, albeit not permanently, because the pro se plaintiffs were not familiar with the
proposition that respondeat superior does not apply in civil
rights cases.

242

Only through sheer persistence were these three

pro se plaintiffs able to overcome the problems generated by
their lack of legal knowledge. There is no way to know how
many pro se plaintiffs suffered dismissal on the same ground
and, despairing of success, did not appeal adverse decisions.
Another example of an abstruse legal doctrine that poses
problems for the pro se litigant also inheres in civil rights cases.
The Second Circuit's doctrine that State administrative remedies
must be exhausted as a prerequisite to the filing of a civil rights
complaint 243 also has.led to numerous dismissals of cases, many
of which are promptly remanded as soon as they reach the court
of appeals. Here, again, the problem is that the pro se litigant
either does not understand this requirement well enough to
show that it has, in fact, been satisfied, or he is not given an
opportunity to address the question of exhaustion before the
complaint is summarily dismissed. One case last term highlighted this problem in an appellate proceeding that would have
been unnecessary had the district court given the pro se plaintiff
a chance to respond before dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff
attempted to bring a class action on behalf of the inmates of the
protective custody unit at the Great Meadow Correctional Facility, alleging that such inmates were being deprived of the
privileges afforded the general prison population solely because
they were in need of special protection.244 The only administrative procedure available to prisoners to air such grievances,
242
243
244

See text accompanying notes 220-31 supra.
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
Flowers v. Casscles, No. 74 Civ. 65 (N.D.N.Y. 1974). Among the deprivations

alleged were denial of any opportunity to attend religious services, to use the prison law
library, to take more than limited exercise, to participate in recreational and educational
programs, or to receive adequate medical treatment. Flowers also alleged that protective-custody inmates received the same treatment as inmates in punitive segregation,
being confmed to their cells twenty-two hours a day, and required to eat meals in their
cells.
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under New York law, is to advise the Commissioner of Corrections of the existence of the problem and request that the Commissioner take action. 245 Plaintiff Flowers had written to the
Commissioner, and had received in reply a letter from a member
of the Commissioners staff, informing him that, if he was dissatisfied with the loss of privileges, he could yield his protective
custody status and rejoin the general prison population. Thus,
the plaintiff was left with a choice between the meager
amenities of prison life and his physical safety; it was clear that
all possible administrative remedies had been exhausted.
However, plaintiff Flowers evidently was unaware of the
exhaustion requirement, or that the letter he had written could
be viewed as a legally necessary step to satisfy that requirement. Thus, he did not mention his correspondence with the
Commissioner in his district court complaint. The complaint was
dismissed sua sponte, before any answer had been filed, on the
24
ground that administrative remedies had not been exhausted. G
Flowers appealed this decision and, in response to the district
court's announcement that he had not taken appropriate steps to
bring his problem to the attention of prison officials, attached to
his appellate papers copies of his letter and the Commissioner's
reply. The Second Circuit remanded the case, specifying in its
order that the letters disclosed that administrative remedies had
247
been exhausted.
Even a pro se plaintiff who is aware of the exhaustion requirement would not be likely to understand all of the ramifications of the doctrine so as to be able to protect his complaint
against an undeserved dismissal. For example, several cases
that had been summarily dismissed for nonexhaustion were
remanded last term on the ground that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the complaint seeks only
damages. 248 While the plaintiffs in these cases knew they were
24SSee 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.9 (1970).
246 Flowers v. Casscles, No. 74 Civ. 65, Memorandum-Decision and Order (N.D.N.Y.

1974).
247 Flowers v. Casscles, No. 74-8077, Order (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 1975).
248 See Ray v. Fritz, 468 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 494 (1973); Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 599 (2d Cir. 1974). Cases remanded

last term on this ground include Hiney v. Wilson, 520 F.2d 589, 590 (2d Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); United States ex rel. Haymes v. Preiser, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1975) (mene);
Ransom v. LaVallee, No. 75-8153, Order (2d Cir. July 17, 1975); Abdul Rabb v. Cassdes, No. 74-8161, Order (2d Cir. May 14, 1975); Abdul Rabb v. Preiser, No. 74-8129,
Order (2d Cir. May 14, 1975).
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only seeking damages, they did not know that this fact had excused them from complying with a requirement whose existence
was unknown to most of them. Another exception to the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is where
exhaustion would be futile. 249 The Second Circuit remanded several cases last term that had been dismissed for nonexhaustion, after determining that exhaustion would have been
futile;25° but the pro se papers in those cases showed that it is
unrealistic to expect a pro se litigant to successfully identify and
argue the issue of futility of exhausting specific administrative
remedies. Further, the Second Circuit has recognized that the
viability of imposing an exhaustion requirement at all is somewhat doubtful in light of dicta in numerous recent Supreme
Court cases stating that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
no longer required in civil rights cases. 251 This issue has been
raised in a number of recent cases, but scrupulously avoided by
the court of appeals. 252 It is not likely that, without the aid of
briefs and argument by persons with legal training, a pro se
litigant could successfully frame the argument that the exhaustion requirement should be abolished in a way that would encourage the court to confront this issue.
Procedural mishaps also plague the pro se litigant. While
the Second Circuit is generous in forgiving many procedural irregularities caused by a litigant's unfamiliarity with court rules,
there are some defects that cannot be corrected by the circuit
court. For example, failure to file a timely notice of appeal in
the district court is a jurisdictional defect which must lead to
dismissal of an attempted appeal, even in a pro se case. 253 A
49

Plano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1974).
2-' See, e.g., Coggins v. Preiser, No. 73-8391, Order (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 1975).
251 See Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1974); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d
636, 639 (2d Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion). See generally Note, Exhaustion of State
Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1968). The question of
2

whether a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before commencing a suit
under the Civil Rights Act is currently pending before the Supreme Court. Burrell v.
McCray, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975) (exhaustion not required), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct
264 (1975).
252 See United States ex rel. Haymes v. Preiser, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1975) (re-

versal without opinion); Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1974). In the cases cited
in notes 248 and 250 supra, the district court had dismissed the complaints for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, the Second Circuit did not examine the
viability of the exhaustion requirement; rather, the court fit those cases into previously
declared exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, and remanded to the district courts.
253 FED. R. App. P. 3(a), 4; see In re Orbitec Corp., 520 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1975)
(pro se); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 1967); Guido v. Ball, 367
F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1966).
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number of pro se appeals had to be dismissed last term because
the litigants had not filed their notices of appeal within the allotted time. 2 54 Also, the Second Circuit is helpless to reinstate a
civil litigant's right to trial by jury where the litigant has failed
to file a timely notice of demand for a jury trial. 2 5 Po se
litigants, moreover, spend an abundant amount of time, energy
and money attempting to appeal orders that any attorney
6
could immediately identify as interlocutoly.25 Even where the
litigant needs the assistance of the Second Circuit to straighten
out a procedural imbroglio, the court cannot extend its jurisdiction to offer its help.
The obstacle course comprised of esoteric legal doctrines,
complex procedural requirements, and summary disposition,
proves fatal to many pro se litigants each term. Some of the
factors discussed above merely test the pro se's persistence and
patience by prolonging the amount of time and by multiplying
the number of court proceedings necessary before a case reaches
its resolution. But other mistakes made by the pro se, or decisions made by the district court, can permanently impair the
litigant's chance of ultimate success. No matter how generous
the Second Circuit is willing to be in minimizing the effects of
the pro se's lack of substantive or procedural knowledge, the
fact remains that limitations on the court's jurisdiction can preclude, at times, assistance. or forgiveness; that some litigants
unknowingly relinquish their opportunity to bring their cases before the court of appeals; and that some litigants, perplexed by
the proceedings below or failing to recognize that the district
court has erred, simply give up.
IV. The Indigent Civil Litigant's
Right to Counsel
The cases discussed in the previous sections demonstrate
that the court of appeals can neither remove all the disadvantages nor soothe all the frustrations endemic to pro se litigation.
"

54

E.g., Calhoun v. Riverside Research Inst. No. 75-7415, Order (2d Cir. Sept. 19,

1975); Torres v. United States, No. 75-8151, Order (2d Cir. July 7, 1975).
55 See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b),(d) (jury trial is waived if not demanded within ten

days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue).
256 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) allows an appeal to be taken only from "final decisions";

28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970) allows appeals from interlocutory orders only in limited circumstances. For examples of pro se appeals that were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see,
e.g., Cooper v. Oglesby, No. 75-7054, Order (2d Cir. June 11, 1975) (appealing a nonappealable order which had not even been entered); Altman v. Nixon, No. 74-2429, Order
(2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1975) (appealing denial of a motion to reinstate a previously dismissed
complaint, after an amended complaint had been filed).
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Most pro se litigants have reached the same conclusion and
agree that a kindly attitude on the part of the court is no substitute for an attorney. It seems somewhat ironic to speak of a
right to proceed pro se when most civil litigants approach the
courts pro se only when they have no other choice. Indeed, the
first step most pro se litigants take in any judicial proceeding is
to request that the court assign them counsel.
However, indigent civil litigants have no sixth amendment
right to court-appointed counsel, even in habeas corpus and
other quasi-criminal proceedings. 257 Whether to assign counsel is
a question left to the discretion of the court. 258 Generally, in deciding a motion for assignment of counsel, the court considers
whether counsel would be "useful, ' 25 9 by examining the claim presented to see if it is substantial and complex, and by determining if complicated proceedings, such as an evidentiary hearing
or a trial, will be necessary. However, some jurists believe that
assignment of counsel in some circumstances may be a matter
not only of the court's convenience, but also of due process. The
Second Circuit has stated that it is "a better practice" to assign
counsel where a case presents a triable issue of fact, and has suggested that it may be reversible error for a district court to fail
to appoint counsel to assure that a litigant receives a fair and
2 10
meaningful hearing when complex factual issues are involved.
The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit expressed this point in even stronger terms:
[T]he appointment of counsel may sometimes be mandatory even in those areas in which the Sixth Amendment does
not apply. This is true when the circumstances of a defendant
or the difficulties involved in presenting a particular matter
are such that a fair and meaningful hearing cannot be had
without the aid of counsel. Compliance with the due process
clause of the
Fifth Amendment then requires that counsel be
261
appointed.
257 See Day v. United States, 428 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1970); Desmond v.
Board of Parole, 397 F.2d 386, 391 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968); Qucor
v. Lee, 382 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1967); LaClair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486, 488
(7th Cir. 1967); Brown v. Cameron, 353 F.2d 835, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Crowe v. United
States, 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); Note,
PrisonerAssistance on Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 19 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889
(1967).
258
See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1916(d) (1970); Muhammad v.
McGinnis, 362 F.2d 587, 588 (2d Cir. 1966).
29 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1953).
260 United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wlkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1960).

261 Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1962) (footnotes omitted);
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One of the "circumstances" the Ninth Circuit mentioned
which may necessitate assignment of counsel as a matter of due
process must undoubtedly be that the litigant is incarcerated. In
a recent report on pro se litigation in the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York, the Committee on the Federal Courts of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York considered
the handicaps suffered by incarcerated civil rights litigants:
While it is true that virtually all pro se litigants labor
under serious disadvantages in conducting litigation, the
prisoner-plaintiff is obviously under additional handicaps by
reason of the fact of his confinement and the inadequacy of
most prison libraries (assuming he even knows how to proceed
with his lawsuit) and the low educational levels among prisoners. An incarcerated pro se Section 1983 litigant will be faced
with the difficulties of formulating a proper pleading, in obtaining any necessary discovery, in preparing motion papers
or briefs, and, of course, in presenting his case at trial.1 2
Unlike most of the problems discussed in the previous sections, some of these hurdles cannot be overcome by the incarcerated pro se litigant, no matter how great his legal knowledge
or persistence, and no matter how willing the court is to render
assistance. Incarceration may conclusively prevent a litigant
from undertaking meaningful discovery, from doing thorough
legal research, from attending pretrial conferences and hearings,
and from overseeing the progress of his case. As the Committee
found, "Ithe lack of any lawyer to represent the26 plaintiff normally means that the case will often lay dormant." 3
The truth of this observation was dramatically demonstrated by one proceeding before the Second Circuit last term.
Plaintiff Walter Johnson had filed a civil rights complaint in the
Eastern District of New York on July 31, 1973, also seeking
leave to proceed in forma pauperis and requesting assignment of
counsel. 26 4 The complaint alleged instances of police brutality
and therefore stated a colorable claim under section 1983 of title
42,265 which could only be resolved by trial. The district court,
accord, Roach v. Bennett, 392 F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Shelby v. Phend,
445 F.2d 1326, 1328 (7th Cir. 1971); Hawldns v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 951 (Sth Cir.
1970); Proctor v. Harris, 413 F.2d 383, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, C.J. concurring).
262 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 107, 109 (1975) (footnote omitted).
263

Id.

2- Johnson v. City of New York, No. 73 Civ. 1142, Complaint (E.D.N.Y., filed July
31, 1973).
29542 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See, e.g., Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972)
(civil rights claim stated); MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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having decided that the complaint did state a claim, contacted an
attorney to ask whether he would handle the case. After reviewing the court files, the attorney wrote to the district court on
February 7, 1974, to say that he was unable to accept the assignment because of other commitments. No further attempts
were made to find counsel to represent plaintiff Johnson, and no
ruling was entered on Johnson's motion for assignment of counsel. Plaintiff Johnson did the only thing an incarcerated litigant
can do to move his case along-he wrote letter after letter to
the district court, inquiring about the progress of his case, requesting the court's assistance, and renewing his motion for assignment of counsel time and again. Only once did he receive
any reply to his queries. Finally, almost a full two years after
filing his complaint, Johnson, despairing of receiving attention
from the district court,
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in
266
the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit ordered an immediate answer from
respondents. 267 It seemed that the mandamus proceeding would
furnish the court with a rare opportunity to consider and comment on the problem posed by nonfrivolous prisoners' civil rights
complaints. However, the respondent's answer was to moot
the mandamus by promptly assigning counsel to represent
Johnson.268 Thus, Johnson's case finally saw some progress,
but only because this particular plaintiff had sufficient legal
knowledge to utilize the mandamus procedure. The Second
Circuit addresses the problem of dormant cases only in the context of petitions for writs of mandamus; 269 therefore, the
court has never had occasion to write an opinion on the subject. The reason is that mandamus proceedings are analogous
to the proverbial squeaky wheel. When a prisoner seeks a writ
of mandamus because his case has been languishing for years in
the district court, the district judge, reluctant to be the subject
400 U.S. 852 (1970); Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970).
266 Johnson v. Neaher, No. 75-8140 (2d Cir. 1975).
26 7
Id., Order of July 2, 1975 (unreported). See FED. R. APp. P. 21(b), which provides for the issuance of an order compelling a response from the respondent when the
court is contemplating granting a writ of mandamus.
268 See Johnson v. Neaher, No. 75-3035, Order (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1975) (unreported)
(denying petition for mandamus as moot).
269 Because there is no final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970),
appeal does not lie. Thus, a neglected litigant can reach the court of appeals only via the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970), which permits the court of appeals to issue
extraordinary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
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of a writ of mandamus, will take prompt action in that particular
case. But it is only the squeaky wheel which is oiled; there is no
way to estimate the number of prisoners' civil rights complaints
that have been pending in the district courts for as many years
as Johnson's, or even longer, where the plaintiffs have not
sought relief by mandamus.
In fairess to the district judges, it must be noted that the
problem of prisoners' civil rights cases is not susceptible of easy
resolution. It is virtually impossible, for the reasons previously
noted, to proceed efficiently with a case whose prosecutor is incarcerated. It is also difficult and time-consuming to find enough
qualified attorneys to represent these litigants. The reason is
simple: there is no statutory provision for compensating assigned
attorneys in civil rights actions. 270 Nor is there provision for
reimbursement for expenses; an attorney who accepts such an
assignment may find that, not only is he not being paid, but he
also is financing the litigation.
Recognizing the dilemma confronting the district courts as
well as the incarcerated ligitants, the Committee on the Federal
Courts recommended that attorneys be assigned in all prisoners'
civil rights cases, and that statutory authority for compensation
for fees and expenses in such cases be provided to make such
representation feasible.271
Especially where the litigant is incarcerated, the assignment
of counsel is often a sine qua non of meaningful and fair adjudication. Numerous decisions have spoken eloquently of prisoners'
constitutional right of access to the courts. 2 The right to submit papers to the courts is an empty one if the courts have no
concomitant obligation to enable a prisoner to prosecute his suit.
As suggested by the Committee, the courts are neither a wellqualified nor an appropriate source of assistance to one of two
adversaries in an adversary system premised on the neutrality
of the court. 273 The conclusion is thus inescapable that assigning
counsel, at least in nonfiivolous prisoners' civil rights cases, may
270 Compare the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970), which provides
compensation for attorneys who undertake discretionary assignments.
271 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 107, 110-11 (1975).
2 72
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941);
Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
189 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 & 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
273 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 107, 109-110; see Duniuay, The Poor Man in the
FederalCourts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270, 1284 (1966).
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not be merely a matter of discretion, but of constitutional im274
perative.
The same reasoning might well be extended to other,
perhaps all, pro se cases. As a corollary to the constitutional
right of access to the courts and the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws, there may be a
right to the assistance of counsel even in nonprisoner civil cases.
Justices Black and Douglas have expressed the belief that there
is such a right. 75 Extrapolating from the right of access to the
courts declared in Boddie v. Connecticut,276 which struck down
a State filing fee for divorce actions, Justice Black declared that
"there cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process until
'2 77
every serious litigant is represented by competent counsel.
Most pro se litigants would agree.
V. Conclusion
The issue in Faretta v. California278 concerned the judicial
practice of forcing an attorney on an unwilling defendant. Rejecting a mechanistic interpretation of the Bill of Rights, the
Supreme Court perceived that the "ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist
on the opposite of that right. '279 In Hohfeldian analytical jurisprudential terms this, of course, is correct. 28 0 The Court
274 The Federal Courts Committee, in its report, noted that even where there Is no
compensation available, there are methods for finding attorneys to represent indigent
litigants where such representation is believed to be necessary. The Committee cited the
example of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nevada who, upon concluding that
one county in the State was providing inadequate assistance of counsel to indigents,
wrote to the members of the Bar of the county, directing them to accept assignments
from the Legal Aid Society. The Justice cited Canon 2 of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty To
Make Legal Counsel Available." 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A 107, 114 n.21 (1975).
275 Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954-60 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); id. at 960 (Douglas, J.).
278 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
277 Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. at 959. In light of the fact that tho
Supreme Court has refused more logical extensions of Boddie, see Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656 (1973) (appellate court filing fee); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973) (bankruptcy filing fee), Justice Black's optimism in believing that the Court might
accept such an extension of the constitutional right of access to the courts may well be
unwarranted. For a discussion of the status of the constitutional right of access to the
courts after Boddie and Kras, see authorities cited note 197 supra.
278 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
279 Id. at 819 n.15, quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). See
also 2422 U.S. at 841 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
80 See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
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went on, however, to find an independent right of self-representation. 28 ' But the question now posed is not merely a syllogistic one; indeed, logic is only a single integrant in the
framework of the legal system. The substance is constructed by
making intelligent value judgments with respect to each altelmative element. 28 2 Thus, when the question becomes whether counsel should be appointed to represent the pro se litigant who, as
yet, is not entitled thereto, we must ask whether the structure
will be strengthened by so doing.
The ultimate concerns of the members of the FarettaCourt
lay in three areas: fairness, efficiency, and justice. In the context of criminal litigation, the Court observed that "the help of a
lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial."2 83 But is
not fairness also a goal of non-criminal litigation? Several of the
Justices added, absent opposition, that "[ilt hardly needs repeating that courts at all levels are already handicapped by the unsupplied demand for competent advocates, with the result that it,
often takes longer to complete a given case than experienced
counsel would require." 28 4 But would not the appointment of
counsel in non-criminal cases also reduce the burdens on the judicial system? Finally, the dissenting Chief Justice stated that
"[b]oth [the prosecutor and the trial judge] are charged with the
duty of insuring that justice, in the broadest sense of that term,

Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) and 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). See also Cook,
Hohfeld's Contributionsto the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721 (1919).
2' 422 U.S. at 819-20 n.15. See also id. at 837 (Burger, 0.3., dissenting).
2
82 Compare id. at 936 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ('This case... is another example
of the judicial tendency to constitutionalize what is thought 'good' ")with Robbins, The
Admissibility of Social Science Evidence in Person-Orientcd Legal Adjudication, 50
INDIANA L.J. 493, 508-09 & n.66 (1975).
2
422 U.S. at 832-33 (footnote omitted).
284 Id. at 845 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.). See
also id. at 846 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted):
Unless, as may be the case, most persons accused of crime have more vit than
to insist upon the dubious benefit that the Court confers today, we can expect
that many expensive and good faith prosecutions will be nullified on appeal for
reasons that trial courts are now deprived of the power to prevent.
On the need for competent counsel generally, see, e.g., Burger, The Special Shills of
Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our
System of Justice?, 42 FoRDaAm L. REV. 227 (1973); Kaufman, The Court Needs a
Friendin Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175 (1974). Compare Kaufman, A Response to Objections
to the Second Circuit's Proposed District Court Admission Rules, 61 A.B.A.J. 1514
(1975) and Note, New Admission Rules Proposed for Federal District Courts, 61
A.B.A.J. 945 (1975) with Ehrlich, A Critique of the Proposed New Admission Rule for
DistrictCourts in the Second Circuit, 61 A.B.A.J. 1385 (1975).
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is achieved in every criminal trial. ' 2 5 1But if justice is what we
veritably seek, ought we not search for it in every case and
cause, both criminal and civil?
Presumably, the Court unanimously would respond to each
of the above questions in the affirmative. Why then, one might
ask, must we confront the problem addressed by this article?
The answer is that many courts narrowly adhere to the prescripts of the sixth amendment, without adequately recognizing
and applying the Due Process Clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 2 6 Thus, although many courts opine that one who
acts as his own attorney "has a fool for a client," 2 7 most decline
to legitimize the proverbial corollary: "He hath good judgment
that relieth not wholly on his own." 2 8 To the extent that the
judgment of counsel will lead to fairer results and minimize the
frustrations of any pro se litigant, we submit that courts are
neglecting their responsibilities in compelling the civil pro se
litigant to appear without counsel.
285 422 U.S. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dis-

senting), quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935): It is an "established
principle that the interest of the State in a criminal prosecution 'is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done.'"
28r The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law . . . . He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
287 See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The first recorded statement of this proverb, as such, probably was: "There is a popular impression, for which
there is a good deal to be said, that a man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,"
British Weekly, Dec. 21, 1911, at 386. Earlier sayings, however, were of similar import.
See, e.g., J. CLARKE, PAROLnIOLOGIA ANGLO-LATINA 22 (1639) ("He that will not be
counselled cannot be helped"); G. HERBERT, OUTLANDISH PROVERBS 363 (1640) ("He
that is his own counsellor knows nothing sure but what he has laid out"); accord, B.
FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK (Aug., 1747); J. RAY, A COLLECTION OF
ENGLISH PROVERBS 6 (1670).
288
G. TORRIANO, SELECTED ITALIAN PROVERBS 57 (1642); accord, J. MAPLETOFT,
SELECTED PROVERBS 1 (1707). We are not unmindful of the adage that "wise men make
proverbs, and fools repeat them," S. PAIIER, MORAL ESSAYS ON PROVIDENCE Viii
(1710), but even "a fool may give a wise man counsel," G. CHAUCER, TROYLuS i. 630
(1374) ("A fool may eek a wis-man ofte gyde"). See also MORIAE ENCOMIUM 160 (J.
Wilson trans. 1668) ("Sometimes a fool may speak a word in season").

